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LEARNING FROM ALL FIFTY STATES: HOW TO
APPLY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS
STATE ANALOGS TO PROTECT THIRD PARTY
INFORMATION FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH
Stephen E. Henderson'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"unreasonable searches and seizures."' Yet as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, the Amendment places no restriction on police
combing through your financial records;2 your telephone, e-mail, and
website transactional records;3 and your garbage left for collection.
Instead "third party information," meaning all information provided to
third parties, receives no Fourth Amendment protection. Hence your
very movements, be they tracked via a police transponder placed on your
vehicle5 or via your mobile phone,6 are seemingly available to police
without any Fourth Amendment limitation.
This state of affairs is not new and has withstood sustained and even
bitter critiques by commentators. But we are not solely dependent upon
' Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law. Yale Law School (J.D., 1999);
University of California at Davis (B.S., 1995). I wish to thank Jules Epstein, Orin Kerr,
Harold Krent, Douglas Ray, Leonard Sosnov, Joseph Thai, and George Thomas for their
insights and encouragement, and Bryan Cutler and Geoffrey Sasso for their able and
enthusiastic research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
2. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
3. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979); United States v. Hambrick,
No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *13-14 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000)
(unpublished); United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000).
4. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
5. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
6. See infra Part 11I.
7. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.7(b)-(c), at 736, 747 (4th
ed. 2004). Wayne LaFave's treatise terms the Court's third-party doctrine "dead wrong"
(in the context of bank records) and deems it "a crabbed interpretation" that "makes a
mockery of the Fourth Amendment" (in the context of phone records). Id. Other
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the Federal Constitution for protection of our constitutional rights. We
are also citizens of states, each of which has its own constitution. And
each of these constitutions includes, among other important provisions, a
"cognate" or "analog" to the Federal Fourth Amendment.8 As Justice
Brennan urged in a famous 1977 article, those provisions can be-and
with respect to third party information should be-interpreted to provide
greater protection. 9 Some states have responded, restricting government
access to information provided to third parties. °
But despite this positive development, there is little understanding of
which states have diverged from the federal doctrine, what solution they
offer in its place, and for what types of third party information. This
Article is intended to fill that void, which accomplishes several goals.
First, because the Fourth Amendment provides only a "constitutional
floor," this Article catalogs the constitutional jurisprudence of all fifty
states to provide a more complete picture of existing protections.
Second, while the "new federalism" in state constitutionalism' is no
longer so "new," many states have only recently expressed a willingness
to diverge from Federal Fourth Amendment analysis. For defense
counsel and others who consider the federal jurisprudence to be
unacceptable, an analysis of "diverging" states can be used to encourage
states to adopt more protective rules.
Finally, one can hope that analysis of state constitutional law will
influence the United States Supreme Court. The Court has previously
considered both state jurisprudence and trends therein. When deciding
whether due process requires that states suppress illegally obtained
evidence, the Court carefully considered state legislation and
jurisprudence and relied on a trend of states adopting the exclusionary
rule. 2 When deciding whether warrantless probable cause arrests in
commentators have warned of the significant amounts of information in the hands of third
parties. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 279, 293-96 (2005); Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 822-26 (2005); Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by
the Government, 75 Miss. L.J. (forthcoming 2006); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and
the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084-85 (2002).
8. For a complete listing of these analogs see infra Appendix.
9. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491,496-97, 502-03 (1977).
10. See infra Part V, tbl. 2.
11. The term "new federalism" is commonly used to refer to the post-1970s
resurgence in state constitutional analysis. See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.11(a), at 703 (2d ed. 1999); Shirley S. Abrahamson & Diane S.
Gutmann, The New Federalism: State Constitutions and State Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 88,
90 (1987).
12. In 1949, when thirty-one states rejected the exclusionary rule and sixteen had
adopted it, the Supreme Court made a careful analysis of state jurisprudence and held that
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public were constitutional, the Court relied on virtual unanimity among
the states allowing such arrests.'3  And when deciding whether
warrantless entry into the home was constitutional, the Court not only
relied upon a lack of such unanimity among the states, but especially
upon a trend of states declaring such entry unconstitutional as a matter
of state constitutional law.14 According to the Court such decisions are
"significant because by invoking a state constitutional provision, a state
court immunizes its decision from review by this Court [, which]
heightened degree of immutability underscores the depth of the principle
underlying the result."'5 For a Court that believes "reasonableness" to
be the touchstone of Fourth Amendment constitutionality, 6 a relevant
criterion should be what jurists in the fifty states consider reasonable.
7
Indeed many of the states that reject the federal third-party doctrine
have done so using the federal "reasonable expectation of privacy"S • 18
criterion. If we are to convince the Supreme Court to abandon its strict
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not require suppression of
evidence obtained via an unconstitutional search or seizure. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 29-31, 33-38 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But of those
states considering the doctrine between 1949 and 1961, over half adopted some form of
exclusionary rule. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651. Although the Mapp Court, chided by the
dissent, see id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting), lamely asserted that state doctrines were
"not basically relevant," it clearly relied in part upon this trend in reversing Wolf and
requiring that states exclude such constitutionally tainted evidence, id. at 651 (majority
opinion). The Court's motivation for allegedly giving less relevance to state doctrine
seems to be that one half of the states still had no exclusionary rule, and that the Court
was eager to reverse Wolf. See id. (documenting state positions); id. at 672-77 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing persuasively that the Court rather lawlessly decided an issue not
raised, briefed, or argued by the parties).
13. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976).
14. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598-600 (1980). The Court declared
warrantless entry unconstitutional despite a majority of states permitting such entry. Id. at
598-601. For an analysis of the Court's reliance on state law in interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, see Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fourth Amendment Federalism? The Court's
Vacillating Mistrust and Trust of State Search and Seizure Laws, 35 SETON HALL L. REV.
911 (2005).
15. Id. at 600.
16. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
17. The Wolf, Mapp, Watson, and Payton Courts looked not only to state
constitutional decisions but also to state legislation. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 598 n.46, 599
nn. 47-48; Watson, 423 U.S. at 419-20; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652 n.7; Wolf, 338 U.S. at 30 n.1.
What state legislatures deem reasonable would indeed seem similarly relevant. In the
words of the Payton Court, "when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word
'reasonable,' . . . custom and contemporary norms necessarily play ... a large role in the
constitutional analysis." Payton, 445 U.S. at 600. This Article, however, considers only
state constitutional law.
18. See infra Part V.
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third-party doctrine, we must offer it a workable alternative, perhaps
found among these state "laboratories." '1 9
After briefly describing the federal third-party doctrine, this Article
describes two relatively new technologies that would appear to be
unrestricted under current Fourth Amendment doctrine, mobile phone
tracking and data mining,0 and explains the risk to our privacy from
these and other technological developments. This discussion includes
three published opinions by federal magistrates in late 2005 that
demonstrate an unease with the third-party doctrine in the context of
location tracking. This Article then categorizes and explains the
constitutional doctrine in each of the fifty states. This study reveals that
eleven states reject the federal third-party doctrine and ten others have
given some reason to believe they might reject it. When combined with
the eleven other states that have diverged from the Fourth Amendment
on some substantive issue, this is an impressive tally. As would be
expected, the fifty-state survey provides many alternative solutions. The
author favors a broad definition of "search" restricted by a totality-based
consideration of reasonableness.2' This model was used in a recent
Indiana decision that provides a workable rule for the Fourth
Amendment in modern times.22 The author proposes that both state and
federal courts apply such a totality approach to devise a spectrum of
protections for different types of third party information. Without such a
reanalysis, technology will allow the government to gather increasing
amounts of information without constitutional restraint, leading both to
an expectation and reality of no privacy.
II. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
At one time the Fourth Amendment's protection of "persons, houses,
papers, and effects, 23 was read narrowly, restricting only government
19. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory.").
20. This Article uses "data mining" loosely to refer to extracting any data from an
aggregated database. See infra note 105.
21. Of course not all commentators agree. Two excellent "thrust and parry" articles
concerning the "reasonableness" versus "warrant requirement" debate are Akhil Reed
Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998),
and Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar
and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1133 (1998). See also Scott E. Sundby, A Return to
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV.
383 (1988).
22. See infra note 131.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
[Vol. 55:373
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access to tangible things. Thus in Olmstead v. United States,24 the Court
held the Amendment did not restrict government access to telephone
conversations (human voice traveling as an analog electronic signal)
unless government agents trespassed in order to obtain them.5 Under
this "property-based" or "trespass-based" conception of the Fourth
Amendment, if there was no encroachment on a defendant's property
interest there was no search, and therefore could be no violation of the
Amendment.2 6
In Katz v. United States,2 the Court jettisoned the property-based
conception, famously asserting that the "Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places., 2  That protection was infringed when agents
warrantlessly monitored one end of a telephone conversation taking
place inside a closed public telephone booth.29
But if we do not look to the law of trespass, then how are we to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated? The
Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."3 ° Hence an obvious solution would be to
adopt a commonplace, dictionary definition of "search," recognizing that
the Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. While the author favors this construction,3 in order to maintain
the fiction that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional
the Court instead adopted a two-part test first articulated by Justice
Harlan: "[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 32 Although the subjective prong still receives lip service,
24. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
25. Id. at 464-66. For a more complete description of Olmstead and the development
of the third-party doctrine see Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507,
511-21 (2005).
26. Thus government agents were free to eavesdrop from their side of a party wall.
See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). But if the agents used a microphone which penetrated that
wall, even by an inch, the Fourth Amendment would be implicated. See Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506-07, 512 (1961).
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28. Id. at 351.
29. Id. at 348, 351.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See Henderson, supra note 25, at 544-46.
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring): see also Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
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its questionable relevance and potential for government manipulation"
have caused the second requirement to become solely determinative.34
So government conduct only constitutes a Fourth Amendment search
if it invades a "reasonable expectation of privacy." What does this mean
for information we provide to others, including banking, telephone, and
e-mail transactions? According to the Supreme Court, one retains no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information revealed to a third
party, "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed. '' 35 And this is true even if the government is• • 36
responsible for the third party retaining that information. Only in the
contexts of a government-initiated medical test 37 and the home"' has the
Court deviated from this doctrine.
As the author has argued elsewhere, however, the best reading of this
"third-party doctrine" is that it should apply only to information revealed
for that third party's use.39 Thus, although we provide the content of our
telephone conversations to the service provider just like we provide the
digits we dial, only the latter is unprotected. 40 Hence even under the
33. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5 (considering the effect of a police announcement
that all homes will hereafter be subject to random inspections).
34. See id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, §
2.1(c); Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 384 (1974). At least one state that otherwise adopts Katz as a matter of state
constitutional law has therefore explicitly jettisoned the subjective prong. See State v.
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 801-02 (N.J. 1990).
35. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
36. The documents in Miller were retained by the bank pursuant to the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970, which requires banks to preserve such information precisely because it is of
value to government investigations. See id. at 442-43. Today telephone companies are
similarly required to retain toll records for eighteen months. See 47 C.F.R. § 42.6 (2005).
37. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84-86 (2001) (finding urine tests
of pregnant mothers to constitute unreasonable searches in view of their law enforcement
purpose).
38. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding thermal scan of home
to constitute unreasonable search in light of the special protection for homes under the
Fourth Amendment).
39. Henderson, supra note 25, at 524-28.
40. Compare Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967) (protecting the contents
of conversations), with Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (finding no protection for telephone
numbers dialed).
Another limitation might exist for information that is otherwise constitutionally
protected. Medical records might be protected by a GriswoldlWhalenlRoe right to
privacy, in which case obtaining those records without legal process or justification might
not only be an independent constitutional violation, but might also constitute an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (recognizing a constitutionally protected right of privacy);
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 n.23 (1977) (finding that right in the Fourteenth
[Vol. 55:373
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Court's current test, one should retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information provided to an uninterested conduit of
information 4' and information not intentionally provided to any third
party. As the following two examples demonstrate, however, in the
modern world we provide extensive information to third parties for their
use, and that information is being used in ways we probably never
imagined.
III. CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING
To those who still remember the sound of silence, it might seem quite
sufficient that a mobile phone be capable of placing and receiving
telephone calls. But current offerings defy this quaint notion-today's
phones are capable of e-mail communication; videoconferencing; Web
surfing; calendaring; gaming; digital photography and video; storing and
playing music; and receiving content, including live television and,
strangely enough, video produced exclusively for cell phone
Amendment's "concept of personal liberty"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(same); Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding Whalen created a
right to privacy in the nondisclosure of medical records); Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72
F.3d 1133, 1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); Doe v. City of New York, 15 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); Doe v.
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 941 F.2d 780, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); see also Douglas v.
Dobbs, 419 F.3d 1097, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing potential Fourth Amendment
claim based upon release of prescription records); Murphy v. Townsend, 187 F.3d 648, No.
C97-0851 JCC, 1999 WL 439468, at *2 (9th Cir. June 22, 1999) (unpublished table
decision) (same); State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132, 1152 (Conn. 2002) (recognizing right of
privacy but finding no Fourth Amendment violation in release upon law enforcement
request); King v. State, 577 S.E.2d 764, 767 (Ga. 2003) (finding no violation when records
are obtained via search warrant without notice); King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 497 (Ga.
2000) (recognizing right of privacy and finding violation thereof when records are
obtained via subpoena without notice); Stone v. City of Stow, 593 N.E.2d 294, 301 (Ohio
1992) (recognizing right of privacy but finding no Fourth Amendment violation in release
upon law enforcement request); State v. Welch, 624 A.2d 1105, 1112 (Vt. 1992) (same).
But see Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding there is no
constitutional right to nondisclosure of medical information). Several cases have split on
the right to privacy in blood tests. See Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118, 1122 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1997) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in hospital blood tests); People
v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310, 321 (Mich. 1990) (same); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d
135, 139 (Pa. 1994) (finding reasonable expectation of privacy in hospital blood tests); Sam
Kamin, The Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 133-36 (2004) (describing the split of authority).
To this extent the third-party doctrine may not be absolute, but for purposes of this
Article we are not interested in a limitation that will only protect that small category of
information that is otherwise constitutionally protected.
41. Arguably, however, the Supreme Court deviated from this principle in finding no
protection for garbage provided to garbage collectors. See California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988). But see Hempele, 576 A.2d at 806 (disagreeing with the federal doctrine).
20061
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42distribution. You can even use your phone to remotely feed your pet,
43although this is going to require some extra hardware. For our
purposes we are interested in location-based services that take advantage
of cell phone location tracking.
Some degree of location tracking is inherent in cellular telephony. In
order to receive or transmit calls, a customer's cell phone must be able to
communicate with a service provider's tower.44 Even when not in use, a
cell phone that is turned on periodically scans for the strongest signal and
transmits a signal to the nearest tower in order to "check in.,
45
Therefore, for every customer who has a phone turned on, the provider
knows to which tower the customer is closest. If the signal is received by
multiple towers, a provider can triangulate a more accurate location by
comparing the strength and timing of the signal at the different towers.46
In urban areas where towers are close together, this might allow
pinpointing a customer's location to within a block or two, but in rural
areas it will be much less accurate.47 Municipalities are investigating the
42. See James A. Martin, Newest Cell Phone Features, PC WORLD, Mar. 24, 2005,
http://www.pcworld.comhowto/article/,aid,120017,00.asp; Dan Tynan, What's a Cell
Phone, Anyway?, PC WORLD, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,
120149,00.asp (asserting humorously that "[v]oice-only handsets have become as quaint as
hand-crank telephones"). There is more to come, including the use of one-time passwords
sent to a customer's mobile phone and the ability to pay for goods and services using a
Bluetooth-enabled phone. See Martin, supra. Lest one should think proliferation of
features is unique to cell phones, however, consider that there are refrigerators that can
display television, transmit e-mail, and take photographs. See Nadine Brozan, Greetings
From SoFi, N.Y.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, § 11 (Real Estate), at 1 (describing luxury
condos that include such a device).
43. Clive Thompson, Remote Possibilities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 6 (Magazine),
at 80.
44. A great deal of information on how mobile phones work is available on the
Internet. See, e.g., Julia Layton et al., How Cell Phones Work, http://electronics.
howstuffworks.com/cell-phone.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). A nice description is also
contained in In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 750-51
(S.D. Tex. 2005).
45. Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750; Kathryn
Balint, Track Down, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 22, 2002, at El. Phones scan at least
every seven seconds. Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 750.
46. See 911 Calls: More Trouble Ahead?, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2004, at 25, 25. If
the customer is in a location such that the phone's signal is not received by any tower,
there is of course no service and the phone might as well be turned off. For brief
explanations of several methods of determining location see 911dispatch.com, Angle of
Arrival Location Determination, http://www.911dispatch.com/911/aoa.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006).
47. Balint, supra note 45. For location tracking aimed at protective pet-owners and
parents, see Wherify, Potential Applications & Services, http://www.wherifywireless.com/
html/solutions.asp?pageld=47 (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). But even those willing to be
tracked for one purpose (e.g., for the safety of a child or peace of mind of a spouse) likely
do not want that information generally available to the government.
[Vol. 55:373
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use of such location information to monitor traffic flow. 48
Refined location tracking is thought desirable for several reasons.
First, it is of significant utility to emergency services. In February 2001,
Karla Gutierrez skidded off the Florida Turnpike and her BMW plunged
41into a canal. She called 911 from her cell phone, but because she was
unsure of her location rescue workers were unable to locate her despite
the three and a half minutes she conversed with an operator.0 Had she
been calling from a landline phone the operator would have been able to
pinpoint her location. In order to provide similar emergency service to
wireless customers, federal law requires that wireless providers develop
and provide "Enhanced 911" or "E911" service."
E911 requires that providers be able to identify the location from
which a customer is placing a 911 call.5  While at first it was sufficient
that a carrier identify the location of the cell tower receiving the call,
today many providers must be able to pinpoint a customer's location to
within fifty meters. 3 While compliance has apparently been less than
ideal,54 for our purposes what is important is that location technology will
become ubiquitous. If providers can locate a customer dialing 911, that
same technology can locate any customer with an active phone. Having
48. Matt Richtel, Enlisting Cellphone Signals To Fight Road Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2005, at C1.
49. Robert Davis, New Tools Will Make Crash Victims Easier To Find, USA TODAY,
Mar. 7, 2001, at 8D; Carolyn Said & Carrie Kirby, GPS Cell Phones May Cost Privacy, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 19, 2001, at C4.
50. Davis, supra note 49; Said & Kirby, supra note 49. Rescuers later found tire
tracks twelve miles from where Gutierrez had thought she was located. Davis, supra note
49. Had the service provider been contacted and had sufficient time, it could have
determined her approximate location using the tracking inherent in cell phone telephony.
Such tracking has been used to rescue lost hikers. See Balint, supra note 45.
51. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(d)-(m) (2005).
52. Id. § 20.18(d).
53. Id. § 20.18(d)(1), (e), (h). To be more precise, providers utilizing handset-based
location technology (e.g., a GPS-equipped phone) must be able to locate sixty-seven
percent of 911 callers within fifty meters and ninety-five percent of callers within 150
meters. Id. § 20.18(h)(2). As of February 2004, Verizon, Sprint, and Nextel offered
handset-based technology. 911 Calls: More Trouble Ahead?, supra note 46, at 25.
Providers instead utilizing network-based technology (e.g., triangulating position by
calculating signal strength and timing at multiple towers) must be able to locate sixty-
seven percent of callers within 100 meters and ninety-five percent of callers within 300
meters. 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1). As of February 2004, AT&T, Cingular, and T-Mobile
were using network-based technology. 911 Calls: More Trouble Ahead?, supra note 46, at
25. While providers have been able to phase-in this capability over time, unfortunately
neither technology works under all circumstances. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(f); 911 Calls:
More Trouble Ahead?, supra note 46, at 26.
54. See Michael K. Kurtis, Deploying E-911 Phase II in Rural America, RURAL
TELECOMM., Jan. 1, 2004, at 44, 44; 911 Calls: More Trouble Ahead?, supra note 46, at 25.
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paid to develop and provide this capability, providers are now seeking to
make it profitable.55
Knowing a customer's location allows providers to offer additional fee-
based services. AT&T launched the first such service in the United
States in 2002, dubbed "Find Friends. ' ,56 For an extra fee, a customer was
able to track the location of other willing customers via his or her
phone.5 7 "Find Friends" took advantage of the location tracking inherent
in cellular telephony.58
MapQuest, well known for its online maps, recently launched its "FindMe" . 59 ,
Me" service. Unlike "Find Friends," this service takes advantage of a
global positioning system (GPS) receiver located within the customer's
phone. 60 It allows a customer to see where he or she is located, to obtain
a listing of nearby businesses and other destinations of potential interest,
to obtain directions from the current location, and to share his or her
location with family and friends via text messaging or via a private
website. 6' Depending upon conditions, a GPS-enabled phone can
55. One court has referred to this as an "inexorable combination of market and
regulatory stimuli." In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d
747, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Were the government's E911 requirements the sole reason cell
phone providers sought and obtained location information, the Fourth Amendment might
restrict government access. Although the Supreme Court has held that one retains no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information retained by a third party solely to satisfy
government requirements, see discussion of Miller supra Part II, the result should be
different if the government is solely responsible for their obtaining that information, see
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 90 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(distinguishing mandatory reporting of information that would already be obtained from
the government requiring that a private party obtain information). Because location
information is of significant commercial value, the E911 requirements are unlikely to
remain a motivating factor.
56. Balint, supra note 45.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Yardena Arar, Mapping Mania at CTIA, PC WORLD, Mar. 15, 2005,
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,120057,00.asp.
60. Id. GPS stands for Global Positioning System, a set of twenty-seven satellites
(twenty-four active and three alternates) and corresponding ground stations that enable a
portable receiver "visible" to three satellites to determine the receiver's location (latitude
and longitude). See Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How GPS Receivers Work,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gps.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); Webopedia.com,
GPS, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/G/GPS.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). With a
fourth satellite altitude can also be computed. See Webopedia.com, supra. Brain and
Harris include a very nice explanation of how the satellites enable computation of
location. See Brain & Harris, supra.
61. See MapQuest Find Me Frequently Asked Questions, http://findme.mapquest.
com/includes/faq.jsp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). A more annoying implementation would
allow nearby businesses to send unsolicited advertisements. See Said & Kirby, supra note
49.
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pinpoint a customer's location to within a few feet.62
While MapQuest's e-promotion touts the tracking ability as furthering
"peace of mind,, 63 the service is less attractive when one realizes that the
customer thereby shares that information with the service provider and
hence, via the third-party doctrine, makes it available to the government
without Fourth Amendment restraint.6 Nonetheless, this "mobile
commerce" ("m-commerce") or "location-based commerce" is expected
to thrive. According to one market research firm, location-based
commercial services will be a $40 billion market within a few years.65
Marketing potential will encourage a further development, providers
maintaining location data for some period of time. Although it is too
early to know which location-based services will prove profitable, it
seems clear location data has value. Unless prohibited by law, a business
would probably like to know that customers spend an average of fifteen
62. Tynan, supra note 42; MapQuest Find Me Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 61 (citing a range of 5 to 100 meters). A phone that is not GPS-enabled can be used
for such services if it is Bluetooth-enabled, allowing it to communicate with an
independent Bluetooth GPS module. See Grace Aquino, Phones Use GPS To Show You
the Way, PC WORLD, Aug. 2005, http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,121417,00.asp.
The United Arab Emirates is investing in similar GPS technology that will allow the
government to track the location, and hence the speed, of all equipped vehicles driving
within the country. See The Policeman on Your Dashboard, ECONOMIST (TECH. Q.),
Sept. 17, 2005, at 12, 12. The technology is expected to be ready for installation within
four years. Id.
63. See MapQuest Find Me, http://findme.mapquest.com (follow "Watch a Demo"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). If knowing that many drivers are chatting on their
cell phones does not contribute to your "peace of mind," see Steve Chapman, No Simple
Way To End the Threat Posed by Drivers with Cell Phones, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2005, at
13A (noting British Medical Journal study finding drivers using phones are four times
more likely to get into serious crashes), you probably won't like to learn that now drivers
can also peruse maps of potential traffic problems sent to their phone, see MapQuest
Traffic, http://www.mapquest.com/features/main.adp?page=slashmobile-traffic (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006). There are, however, automated implementations that might not
distract drivers. See Henry J. Holcomb, Will Smart Phones and GPS Accelerate
Commuters Toward... Rush Hour's End?, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 24, 2005, at El.
64. It is quite possible the Supreme Court would deem customer location to be
knowingly shared regardless of whether a customer subscribes to such a service. Because
such precise location information is not otherwise necessary to provide the requested
(telephone) service, however, it could also be a crucial distinction to a court accepting a
more limited third-party doctrine. See supra Part II. Moreover use of such a service is
optional as opposed to government mandated. See supra note 55.
65. Tynan, supra note 42. Allied Business Intelligence estimates a $40 billion market
by 2007. Id.; see also Allied Business Intelligence Home Page, http://www.abiresearch.com
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006). For descriptions of several existing services see Grace Aquino,
GPS Cell Phones, PC WORLD, Mar. 22, 2004, http://www.pcworld.com/reviews/article/0,
aid,115273,00.asp, Aquino, supra note 62, and Arar, supra note 59.
20061
Catholic University Law Review
minutes in the store, or that those who patronize it in the morning often
do so after stopping into a coffee shop when one is nearby.66
Location information is also useful for apprehending suspects and
solving crimes. The most famous example of the former might be the use
of cell phone location tracking to find and apprehend infamous hacker
Kevin Mitnick in 1995.6' Location information is also useful in solving
crimes ex post. In a 2004 murder trial prosecutors submitted evidence
that a prepaid cell phone purchased by the defendant had been used to
68place calls in the vicinity of the killing. More recently, cell phone
location information was introduced in the trial of Scott Peterson for the
murder of his wife. 69 Such use is dependent upon providers retaining
location information. The government requires that banks retain
account information and that telephone companies retain toll records for
precisely this reason.70 Although there is no general requirement that
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) retain information, law enforcement
can require that online records be preserved for individual accounts,71
and there are allegations that the Department of Justice may push to
require general retention.72 Hence it would not be surprising if the
66. There are statutory restrictions on marketing personally identifiable location
information. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(c), (h)(1) (2000).
67. Balint, supra note 45. Mitnick has the dubious distinction of being the only
hacker to make the FBI's most-wanted list. See Hacker Gets Prison Term, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1999, at A15; Rene Sanchez, Hacker Goes Underground, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Dec. 11, 1998, at B1l. He is, naturally, now making money as a security consultant. See
Mitnick Security Consulting, LLC Home Page, http://www.mitnicksecurity.com (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006). For other examples of police catching crooks via cell phone
location tracking see Recent Development, Who Knows Where You've Been? Privacy
Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 307, 310-11 (2004).
68. Laura Maggi, Last 2 of 5 Killings Are Linked to Lee, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Oct. 11, 2004, at Al; Keith O'Brien, Lee is Found Guilty in Second Murder,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 13, 2004, at Al. The evidence is an example of
the location tracking inherent in cell phone telephony: the defendant's calls were
transmitted via a cell tower in that location. Id.
69. Diana Walsh & Stacy Finz, The Peterson Trial: Defendant Lied Often, Recorded
Calls Show, Supporters Mislead About Whereabouts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2004, at B1.
70. See supra note 36.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2000) (providing for record retention for a renewable ninety-
day period).
72. See Declan McCullagh, Your ISP as Net Watchdog, CNET NEWS.COM, June 16,
2005, http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-5748649.html (claiming the Department of Justice
(DOJ) is shopping the idea of requiring that ISPs retain records of customer online
activity). Even apart from privacy concerns is a practical concern, however. If significant
data is retained for every user, the data would not only be expensive to retain but would
be too large to search with existing technology. Id.
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government similarly required or requested retention of cell phone
location records.73
Thus cell phone location tracking is partly inherent in the technology,
was encouraged by the desire for effective emergency service, and is
likely to become ubiquitous on account of commercial opportunity. So
we see that if we choose to carry an active cellular phone-and more
74than one-half of Americans do at times -we voluntarily provide our
location to our service provider. This is itself a great danger to privacy.
An itinerary of every location to which one travels, combined with
readily available mapping and satellite imaging technology, is quite
invasive.75 Not only is there no constitutional limitation on what the
provider may do with this information, but there is no constitutional
limitation on the provider voluntarily conveying the information to the
government.76  Here we are dependent upon legislation, and Congress
73. One article reports that the FBI began pressuring carriers to maintain such
records as early as 2001. See Said & Kirby, supra note 49.
74. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau Daily Feature for
June 15: Cell Phones (June 15, 2005), http://press.arrivenet.com/politics/article.php/
668485.html; CTIA-The Wireless Association, Background on CTIA's Semi-Annual
Wireless Industry Survey, http://www.ctia.org/research statistics/index.cfm/AID/10030
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (estimating over 182 million subscribers at the end of 2004).
75. Google now provides both mapping and satellite photographs gratis via Google
Maps. See Google Maps, http://www.maps.google.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). If you
have yet to peruse satellite images of your home, favorite bookstore, and general vicinity,
it is worth doing. For an even more impressive experience, see Google Earth,
http://earth.google.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Cell phones are not the only manner in
which we disclose our location. For example, some travel in GPS-equipped vehicles, see
OnStar Home Page, http://www.onstar.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2006), and others take
advantage of electronic toll collection systems, see E-ZPass Home Page, http://www.
ezpass.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
76. The Fourth Amendment places no restriction on private actors. See United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) ("This Court has ... consistently construed
[the Fourth Amendment] protection as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly
inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or
knowledge of any governmental official."' (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649,
662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))). Other than a short-lived jurisprudence in
Montana that excluded evidence obtained via invasive private searches, see State v. Hyem,
630 P.2d 202, 206-07, 210 (Mont. 1981), overruled by State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153 (Mont.
1985), the author is not aware of any state that has ever deviated from the Fourth
Amendment in this regard. Although this is unfortunate from the perspective of
meaningfully protecting privacy in the modern world, it is perhaps sensible as the
exclusion of evidence from a trial is unlikely to have any effect on would-be private
searchers. Even if such searches were amenable to civil suit based on a "violation,"
private parties are less likely to know this jurisprudence than police. If so, exclusion of
evidence would prevent convictions but would not protect privacy. Private action can of
course be made explicitly criminal or tortious, and such liability is important today when
so much information is in the hands of, or available to, third parties.
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has sometimes responded."
While Congress can limit the disclosure or use of location information,
it can just as easily repeal any such limitation. The focus of this Article is
on constitutional constraints. When the government requests
information from a service provider, one would hope it would be
constitutionally restrained. But according to the third-party doctrine,
that the information was conveyed to the service provider (at least if for
its use) means the government can access that information without any
78Fourth Amendment constraint.
The close of 2005, however, brought a ray of light. In the course of
published opinions interpreting statutory restrictions on government
access to cell phone location information,79 four federal magistrates
addressed the application of the third-party doctrine.8° In three of the• 81
opinions the discussion was dicta given the statutory holding, and none
of them presents more than a cursory constitutional analysis.
Nevertheless the opinions demonstrate a hesitancy to apply the doctrine
to this technology.
77. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000 & Supp. 2002) (restricting voluntary disclosure of
information by an entity providing the public an electronic communications service (e.g.,
e-mail)), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (West Supp. 2005).
78. The recipient of information could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
that information (e.g. the recipient of a personal letter), but likely not when the
information is routine business data. Moreover, a service provider has no interest in
asserting any such legal interest.
79. Because Congress has never addressed this matter directly, the analysis requires a
Herculean attempt to interpret the interstices of at least three complicated statutes, the
Wiretap Act (or "Title III"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, the Stored Communications Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712, and the Pen Trap Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. There is also 18
U.S.C. § 3117(a), which concerns orders for "mobile tracking device[s]," and a potentially
critical provision of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 1002. Given the complexity of the analysis there is no clear winner, but the Southern
District of New York provides an impressive textualist analysis that ably presents the
issues. See In re Application for an Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
80. See Application for an Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435; In re
Application for Order of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005); In re
Application of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re
Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
81. The courts in the Southern District of Texas, the Eastern District of New York,
and the District of Maryland held that as a statutory matter a court could not authorize the
acquisition of cell phone location information absent a warrant supported by probable
cause. See Application for Order of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 598; Application of
the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 295; Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace,
396 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The court in the Southern District of New York permitted
acquisition via a more lenient court order provision of the Stored Communications Act.
See Application for an Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d, at 449-50.
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As the only judge to allow the government's request as a statutory
matter, Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gorenstein of the Southern District of
New York had to determine whether the Fourth Amendment restricted
the requested access. In a straightforward application of the third-party
doctrine, Judge Gorenstein noted that people choose to carry cell
phones, and therefore held that pursuant to Smith v. Maryland there isno cnstiutioal •82
no constitutional restraint. His holding is not as broad as it might have
been, however, because of the limited government request. Rather than
request prospective real-time location information whenever the
suspect's phone was activated, the government only requested the
location of the nearest cell phone tower at the initiation and termination
of every call. 3  Judge Gorenstein therefore did not address the
constitutionality of continual real-time tracking. 4
The other three magistrates opined in dicta that cell phone location
might not be subject to the third-party doctrine," relying in part on a
2004 opinion in the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Forest." In Forest the
court held that agents' supplementing visual surveillance of suspects
traveling on public roadways with cell phone location tracking is not
817
restricted by the Fourth Amendment. The agents played an active role
in generating the information, relying on data obtained by the suspect's
service provider when agents dialed his phone but terminated the call
before it would ring.8 The Sixth Circuit hypothesized that this active
role "might" remove the case from the typical third-party doctrine, but
concluded that the suspect "had no legitimate expectation of privacy in
his movements along public highways," however that information might
be obtained.
82. Application for an Order for Disclosure, 405 F. Supp. 2d, at 449.
83. Id. at 436-37.
84. Id. at 449.
85. See Application for Order of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 605 n.12;
Application of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 323-24; Application for Pen
Register & Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
86. 335 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom.
Garner v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1050 (2005).
87. Id. at 951-52.
88. Id. at 947-48.
89. Id. at 951. The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in articulating whether the
manner or means of obtaining information is relevant if that information could be
obtained constitutionally. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001) (implying
manner is determinative where viewing snow melt is permissible but thermal imaging is
not, and expressly stating that "[t]he fact that equivalent information could sometimes be
obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment"); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion) (implying
manner is determinative where helicopter surveillance is permissible at 400 feet but
airplane surveillance would not be); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984)
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The agents' active role in Forest might be suspect as a matter of Fourth
Amendment law, but the government was not requesting similar
authority in 2005. Instead the four magistrates were presented with a
traditional assertion of the third-party doctrine: a request to obtain
information that is independently provided to a third party, for its use,
irrespective of government conduct. In the District of Maryland the
government requested prospective real-time location tracking of a
suspect's cell phone whenever the phone was turned on.90 In a footnote,
Magistrate Judge James Bredar rejected the government's attempt to
analogize the case to Smith v. Maryland:
Cell site information is not affirmatively and actively conveyed
by the phone's possessor; the cell phone transmits the
information automatically without the possessor's awareness
and possibly without his knowledge....
... Contrary to the government's suggestion, I do not believe
most cell phone possessors realize they can be located within
100-300 meters any time their phone is turned on.91
Judge Bredar's empirical claim seems unlikely to withstand critical
analysis. Even putting aside the significant publicity surrounding cell
phone location tracking for emergency services, traffic monitoring, and
location-based technologies, it seems unlikely that one could realize he
or she is able to receive cell phone calls wherever located without
recognizing that the service provider must know his or her location.
More importantly, a "knowing" standard would not well serve the Fourth
Amendment. Although under an empirical interpretation of "reasonable
expectation of privacy" knowledge could be deemed controlling, that
would mean that the better educated we become as to how technologies
function, the fewer rights we would enjoy. It may be said that "ignorance
is bliss," but it does not commend itself as a constitutional standard. If
Judge Bredar's claim is that the third-party doctrine should only apply to
information we want transmitted to third parties, even if other
information must be transmitted to those same parties in order for them
to provide the desired service, it is without legal support and seems an
unhelpful distinction. Most of us probably no more want the phone
numbers we dial going to our service provider than our location. It has
never been necessary that one desire information be known by a third
party in any meaningful sense, but rather merely that one recognize a
(implying manner is not determinative where ground-based intrusion into open fields is
permissible because same information could be obtained via flyover); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (implying manner is determinative where lip reader could
potentially have obtained same information through phone booth glass).
90. Application for Order of a Pen Register, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
91. Id. at 605 n.12.
[Vol. 55:373
2006]
third party is provided the information and, perhaps, that it must be
utilized to complete the requested service. Perhaps recognizing the
weakness of these arguments, Judge Bredar concluded with a decidedly
normative, if question-begging, claim: "Moreover, cell phone possessors'
expectation of privacy, at least when they are in a non-public place,
seems altogether reasonable. Those who choose to carry a cell phone,
which has been turned on, cannot reasonably be deemed to have
consented to the tracking of their movement by the government." 9
In the Eastern District of New York and the Southern District of
Texas the government only requested location information at call
origination and termination and, if reasonably available, during calls. 93
Both courts addressed the constitutionality of such access in dicta, the
Eastern District of New York adopting the analysis of Magistrate Judge
Stephen Smith of the Southern District of Texas.94 After making an
argument similar to that just addressed, Judge Smith noted that the
United States Code restricts the disclosure of customer location
information. 95 Therefore,
location information is a special class of customer information,
which can only be used or disclosed in an emergency situation,
absent express prior consent by the customer. Based on this
statute, a cell phone user may very well have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in his call location
information.96
While this has an intuitive appeal, neither court addressed significant
Supreme Court precedent to the contrary. There is no Fourth
Amendment protection for garbage left for collection despite typical
97municipal laws forbidding inspection of that garbage. There is no
Fourth Amendment protection for bank records despite laws restricting
their disclosure.98 And there is no Fourth Amendment protection for
open fields despite the law of criminal trespass.99 The Supreme Court has
consistently applied the third-party doctrine as a "trump" over other
legal restrictions.
92. Id. Perhaps it is difficult not to beg the question when opining on what is
"reasonable."
93. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 295 (E.D.N.Y.
2005); In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748-49 (S.D.
Tex. 2005).
94. Application of the U.S. for an Order, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
95. Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
96. Id.
97. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 52 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,443 (1976).
99. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984); id. at 190-91 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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While their constitutional analysis is therefore inadequate, the
decisions demonstrate judges are struggling to find a limitation to the
third-party doctrine given its implications for modern technologies. This
may be important, because presumably they (and hopefully their
colleagues) will seriously consider more developed arguments for
limiting the doctrine when those arguments reach their courtrooms. Any
small fracture in the monolithic federal third-party doctrine is welcome,
and underscores the need for commentators and litigants to articulate
and advocate limitations to the doctrine like that described in later
sections of this Article.
IV. DATA AGGREGATION AND MINING
Cell phone location data is merely one example of the myriad of
information we provide to others. The motor vehicle department knows
our basic physical characteristics and those of the vehicles we drive, and
via traffic cameras or electronic toll tags it may know characteristics of
our travel. Our grocery store coaxes us into providing a database of
every purchase we make via "discount cards," and our airline and hotel
chain of choice know where we visit. For those of us who have
abandoned cash in favor of "plastic," our credit and debit cards provide a
virtual dossier of our daily activities.1°° Our health care provider, insurer,
and pharmacy know what drugs we take; our telephone companies know
who we call, when we call, and from where; and our Internet service
provider knows what websites we visit, what files we download, and who
we interact with via e-mail or instant messaging. Our television provider
may know the content we watch, and other content subscribers such as
magazine distributors and libraries know what we like to read. Local
governments compile data on our homes and our interactions with the
law, including any arrests, convictions, or court judgments. And our
employers, lenders, and schools gather information relevant to their
purposes.
Although the federal third-party doctrine provides no constitutional
restraint on law enforcement accessing this potpourri of information, the
cost of tracking down significant amounts of information from many
different parties provides a disincentive that naturally limits that access.
It is a significant concern, then, when data from disparate sources is
gathered in one place.
100. One enterprising author has written a book chronicling her daily activities based
on more than a decade of credit card statements. The book, by Amy Borkowsky, is
entitled Statements: True Tales of Life, Love, and Credit Card Bills. See Susanna




Certainly the most ambitious, if not infamous, data aggregation and
mining project was the Pentagon's Total Information Awareness (TIA)
program. The goal was to amalgamate a mammoth database of existing
commercial and governmental information and to develop computing
capability sufficient to analyze that immense amount of data in order to
spot suspicious behavior.' ' Although the project was cancelled after
drawing sustained critique for its privacy implications, '°2 various arms of
the federal government continue to engage in data aggregation and
mining.' °3
States have also demonstrated an interest in such projects, although
privacy concerns and general budget shortfalls have also slowed their
development. At one time the federal government had pledged to
support, and sixteen states had signed onto, a project named the
Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX).' °4  The
aim was similar to that of TIA, this time combining commercial and state
databases and using data mining software written by Seisint, now owned
by LexisNexis.' 5 Although only a handful of states remain in the
program, its custom-designed software continues to be used to sort
through the billions of records in its database.' 6
101. John Markoff, Pentagon Plans a Computer System that Would Peek at Personal
Data of Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A12; John Markoff & John Schwartz,
Many Tools of Big Brother Are Now Up and Running, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at Cl;
Robert O'Harrow, Jr., U.S. Hopes To Check Computers Globally, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,
2002, at A4.
102. Carl Hulse, Congress Shuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,
2003, at A20.
103. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL
EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d04548.pdf; Audrey Hudson, Government's Pursuit of Personal Data Lives On,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at Al; Eric Lichtblau, Behind-the-Scenes Battle on Tracking
Data Mining, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at A16; Sampling Finds Federal Data Mining Fails
To Assure Privacy Protections, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 29, 2005, 2005 WLNR
13583359.
104. See John Schwartz, Privacy Fears Erode Support For a Network To Fight Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at C1.
105. Id.; Heather Timmons, Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at C7; see also LexisNexis Home Page, http://www.lexisnexis.com
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006); Seisint Home Page, http://www.seisint.com (last visited Feb. 22,
2006). Data mining, also known as knowledge discovery in databases, is technically the
extraction of previously unknown information from existing data, but the term is often
used to refer to products that merely present existing data in a useable form. See
Webopedia.com, Data Mining, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/data-mining.html
(last visited Feb. 20, 2006). For reasons of readability this Article sometimes uses this
common, though technically incorrect, usage.
106. See Schwartz, supra note 104. The program was also designed to identify
potential terrorists based on that data, but is currently not being used in that manner.
Database Tagged 120,000 as Possible Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A16.
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Whether or not such government projects ultimately attain their
envisioned scope, private data aggregators (sometimes also termed "data
brokers" or "information brokers") provide similar services. 1
7
Companies like ChoicePoint1°8 and LexisNexis have aggregated billions
of pieces of public and nonpublic data in order to provide information to
law enforcement, employers, or other interested parties19 And smaller,
more limited services are also becoming increasingly common. One such
service, MyPubliclnfo, is available online and, for a modest fee, claims to
search through over ten billion public records to produce what it terms a
"public information profile," or "PIP."' 0 A PIP includes information
ranging from address history and real estate holdings to criminal records
and professional licenses."
Such extensive databases represent the apex of the third-party
doctrine. Not only can the government access information provided to
another, but it can almost instantaneously access vast sources of
information provided to unrelated third parties over long periods of time.
Each bit of information once given for a singular purpose is now
obtained for an unrelated, unexpected, and typically undesired purpose.
In the somewhat dystopian, yet humorous, words of a justice of the
Montana supreme court:
I know that the notes from the visit to my doctor's office may
be transcribed in some overseas country under an out-sourcing
contract by a person who couldn't care less about my privacy. I
107. See Tom Zeller Jr., U.P.S. Loses a Shipment of Citigroup Client Data, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2005 at C1 [hereinafter Zeller, U.P.S. Loses Shipment]. Several highly
publicized data breaches at such aggregators and banks have spurred congressional
hearings that may lead to further regulation of this industry. See Tom Zeller Jr.,
Investigators Argue for Access to Private Data, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at Cl.
108. Choice Point Home Page, http://www.choicepoint.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
109. Tom Zeller Jr., How Billions of Pieces of Information are Bought and Sold, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17,2005, at C8; Zeller, U.P.S. Loses Shipment, supra note 107.
110. MyPublicInfo Home Page, http://www.mypublicinfo.com (follow "Learn More"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); see also Identity Theft: A PIP of Progress,
ECONOMIST, July 16,2005, at 59, 59.
111. MyPubliclnfo Home Page, supra note 110. Although MyPubliclnfo naturally
encourages the purchase of one's $79.95 PIP with customer testimonials, the author's
admirably lengthy 210-page PIP was even more boring than his actual life-there was no
"felony on my records," "early id theft" was not "nipped in the bud," and I am not
"forever indebted to [their] service." See MyPubliclnfo Home Page, PIP Testimonials,
http://www.mypublicinfo.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). Of course this is, like not having
a cavity, a good thing. It is also worth noting that companies providing an extensive range
of services, such as Google, themselves gather an enormous amount of disparate data. See
Anick Jesdanun, As Google Grows, So Does Privacy Fear, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July
20, 2005, at F4. For an interesting article describing what a group of graduate students
were able to aggregate for just fifty dollars, see Tom Zeller Jr., Personal Data for the
Taking, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at Cl.
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know that there are all sorts of businesses that have records of
what medications I take and why. I know that information
taken from my blood sample may wind up in databases and be
put to uses that the boilerplate on the sheaf of papers I sign to
get medical treatment doesn't even begin to disclose. I know
that my insurance companies and employer know more about
me than does my mother. I know that many aspects of my life
are available on the Internet. Even a black box in my car-or
event data recorder as they are called-is ready and willing to
spill the beans on my driving habits, if I have an event-and I
really trusted that car, too.
In short, I know that my personal information is recorded in
databases, servers, hard drives and file cabinets all over the
world. I know that these portals to the most intimate details of
my life are restricted only by the degree of sophistication and
goodwill or malevolence of the person, institution, corporation
or government that wants access to my data.
I don't like living in Orwell's 1984; but I do. And, absent the
next extinction event or civil libertarians taking charge of the
government (the former being more likely than the latter), the
best we can do is try to keep [Uncle] Sam and the sub-Sams on
a short leash. 2
Unfortunately the federal doctrine, unlike that of some of the states,
provides no leash at all.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Each state has a constitutional analog to the Federal Fourth
Amendment, and some have an explicit privacy provision that has no
federal counterpart.1 3 It wasn't until the 1930s, however, that state
constitutional provisions began to play any significant role in American
constitutional jurisprudence, and they didn't play a prominent role until
the 1970s.114 Since that time a number of states have chosen to diverge
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
112. State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 2005 MT 180, 31, 33, 35, 328 Mont. 10, 31,
33, 35, 116 P.3d 800, 31, 33, 35 (Nelson, J., concurring). This case is described in more
detail in Part VI of this Article.
113. See infra Appendix. Although it can be instructive to compare the texts of the
various provisions, it is not worth breaking up the flow of the Article to accommodate the
lengthy list, and the individual explanatory footnotes are themselves already rather
lengthy.
114. See1 LAFAVE ET AL.,supra note 11, § 2.11(a).
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The following tables indicate the position of each state with respect to
the federal third-party doctrine. Table one includes all fifty states, but
without any supporting documentation. Tables two through five include
supporting footnotes directing the reader to the state's most relevant
decisions."' While it is sometimes obvious that a state rejects or adopts
the federal doctrine, in other instances there is little caselaw from which
to make an assessment.f'6 Hence the tables include some measure of
uncertainty. Moreover, there is ambiguity within the doctrine itself. A
state that has diverged with respect to canine sniffs or garbage pulls will
not necessarily diverge with respect to more traditional information in
the hands of third parties. The footnotes allow the reader to parse each
state's jurisprudence and appreciate the gaps therein.
115. Although the references for each state vary according to what caselaw is
available, the author looked for state responses to, inter alia, Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) in telephone numbers
dialed); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding no REP in bank records);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (finding no REP in garbage left for
collection); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (finding no REP in vehicle
location); and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that a canine sniff is not
a search).
116. A number of factors might contribute to this lack of caselaw. First, defense
counsel might do an inadequate job of independently arguing the state constitutional
ground. Although ideally this would not happen, arguing state grounds can be a
substantial task. See e.g., State v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 293, 301 (Wash. 1996) (potentially
requiring briefing on six complex factors); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222 (Wash. 2003)
(no longer requiring such briefing once it became "settled" that the state analog is more
protective). Second, some states have traditionally interpreted their state analog in
lockstep with the Fourth Amendment with little to no analysis, leaving one to search in
vain for independent analysis or even a statement that the state constitution will be
interpreted in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. Third, some issues might not arise
as constitutional issues either because the state strictly governs the relevant conduct by
statute, because the police consistently utilize a protective procedure as a matter of custom
or good policy, or because the police simply have not used a given method of investigation
(or at least have not relied upon it at trial).
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117. This category includes states that diverge only as to remedy. See infra note 150.
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118. California has adopted Katz's REP criterion, see People v. Chapman, 679 P.2d 62,
66 (Cal. 1984), but was a leader in rejecting the federal third-party doctrine. The pre-
Miller decision of Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974) (holding one
retains a REP in bank records), was adopted by Justice Brennan in dissent in Miller and
continues to be one of the most persuasive opinions in jurisdictions deciding to reject
Miller. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 447-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting). California likewise
diverges by finding a REP in telephone numbers dialed and garbage left for collection.
See People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 746 (Cal. 1979) (en banc) (telephone); People v. Krivda,
486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (garbage), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); People v.
Edwards, 458 P.2d 713, 718 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (garbage); People v. Larkin, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 760, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1987) (telephone).
A 1982 constitutional amendment eliminated suppression of evidence as a remedy for
state constitutional violations. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). Thus evidence will not be
suppressed unless mandated by the Federal Fourth Amendment. See People v. Lance, 694
P.2d 744, 749 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). The amendment did not, however, alter substantive
California constitutional law, and civil remedies are available for violations thereof. Id. at
755-56; CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1 (West Supp. 2005).
119. Colorado has adopted Katz's REP criterion, Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 612 P.2d
1117, 1120 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); People v. Dunkin, 888 P.2d 305, 307 (Colo. Ct. App.
1994), but rejects the federal third-party doctrine as it applies to electronic tracking,
People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815-18 (Colo. 1985) (en banc), telephone numbers dialed
and toll records, People v. Timmons, 690 P.2d 213, 215 (Colo. 1984) (en banc); People v.
Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 26-27 (Colo. 1984) (en banc); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 144
(Colo. 1983) (en banc), and bank records, People v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216, 1220-21 (Colo.
1987) (en banc); Benson v. People, 703 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Colo. 1985); Charnes, 612 P.2d at
1121. The court agrees, however, that one retains no REP in garbage left for collection
because, unlike telephone and bank records, people know members of the public might
snoop in their garbage. People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1276-77 (Colo. 1992) (en banc).
There is also no protection for power consumption records because they do not reveal any
discrete information about, or intimate details of, a customer's activities. Dunkin, 888
P.2d at 308. Unlike the federal doctrine, a canine sniff of objects is sometimes a search
requiring reasonable suspicion. See People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 991 (Colo. 2001) (en
banc) (discussing sniff of luggage); People v. May, 886 P.2d 280, 282 (Colo. 1994) (holding
sniff of mail requires reasonable suspicion); People v. Boylan, 854 P.2d 807, 812 (Colo.
1993) (en banc) (same); People v. Wieser, 796 P.2d 982, 985 (Colo. 1990) (en banc)
(holding sniff of exterior of storage locker from public walkway does not constitute a
search); People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 377-79 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (holding sniff of safe
taken from home by burglar requires reasonable suspicion). Thus in Colorado one retains
a REP in bodily information not discernable by ordinary human senses. See People v.
Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792, 794-95 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (subjecting hands to an
ultraviolet lamp constitutes a search).
Despite the many positive developments in Colorado there is one bit of troubling dicta:
Given the rapid advances in computer and telecommunications technology, a
person's reasonable expectations of privacy in telephone and bank records may
have changed since we decided Sporleder and DiGiacomo, so that the decisions




may be subject to challenge. However, in the narrow context of this case, that
question is not properly before the court.
People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759 n.2 (Colo. 1999).
120. Historically Florida interpreted its state analog to provide greater protection than
the Federal Fourth Amendment, but a 1982 constitutional amendment requires that the
state provision "shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 12. However, via a prior 1980 amendment, Floridians have an explicit
constitutional right of privacy, id. § 23, and the courts have used this provision to recognize
and protect an expectation of privacy in bank and telephone records, Shaktman v. State,
553 So. 2d 148, 151-52 (Fla. 1989) (recognizing a REP in telephone numbers dialed and
requiring reasonable suspicion for installation of a pen register); Winfield v. Div. of Pari-
Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing a REP in bank records but
allowing access via subpoena without notice).
The Florida jurisprudence is certainly not a model of clarity, however. Courts
sometimes imply that the privacy amendment should be "trumped" where the later-in-
time conformity amendment is applicable, State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.
1987); Limbaugh v. State, 887 So. 2d 387, 391-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), review denied,
903 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2005), and the state supreme court has given short shrift to the
relationship between the sections, Shaktman, 553 So. 2d at 151 n.8; see also Thomas C.
Marks, Jr., Now You See It, Now You Don't, Privacy and Search and Seizure in the Florida
Constitution: Trying To Make Sense Out of a Tangled Mess, 67 ALB. L. REV. 691, 692
(2004). In several instances the appellate courts have followed the conformity amendment
without considering whether the privacy provision would grant greater protection. See
State v. Rabb, No. 4D02-5139, 2005 WL 2218980, at *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2005)
(canine sniff); State v. Fisher, 591 So. 2d 1049,1050 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (garbage left
for collection); Johnson v. State, 492 So. 2d 693, 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (electronic
tracking); Stone v. State, 402 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (garbage left for
collection).
121. Hawaii has adopted Katz's REP criterion, State v. Tau'a, 49 P.3d 1227, 1237
(Haw. 2002), but has diverged from the federal doctrine by finding a REP in telephone
numbers dialed, State v. Rothman, 779 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Haw. 1989). The opinion contains little
analysis, however, and a year later the same court found no REP in bank records without
even mentioning this divergence. State v. Klattenhoff, 801 P.2d 548, 552 (Haw. 1990).
Neither opinion cites State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Haw. 1985), an earlier decision
finding a REP in garbage left for collection. Hawaii's jurisprudence regarding canine
sniffs is also rather unique, holding that canine sniffs generally are not searches for
purposes of the Hawaii Constitution but nonetheless requiring they satisfy a
reasonableness balance. State v. Snitkin, 681 P.2d 980, 983-84 (Haw. 1984); State v.
Groves, 649 P.2d 366, 371-73 (Haw. 1982). Despite this lack of clarity, the court has at
times used strong language to advocate privacy:
Our willingness to afford greater protection of individual privacy rights than
is provided on the federal level arises from "our view [that] the right to be free of
'unreasonable' searches and seizures under article I, section 5 of the Hawai['Ji
Constitution is enforceable by a rule of reason which requires that governmental
intrusions into the personal privacy of citizens of this State be no greater in
intensity than absolutely necessary."




State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 901-02 (Haw. 1995) (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58-59 (Haw. 1974)) (rejecting federal
doctrine of apparent authority).
122. Idaho has adopted Katz's REP criterion, but has diverged from federal doctrine
by finding a REP in telephone numbers dialed. State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1163-65
(Idaho 1988). However, Idaho provides no protection for garbage left for collection.
State v. McCall, 26 P.3d 1222, 1224 (Idaho 2001); State v. Donato, 20 P.3d 5, 10 (Idaho
2001). The state does not appear to have decided whether a customer retains a REP in
bank records. See State v. Patterson, 87 P.3d 967, 973 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (assuming
there is a REP based on party stipulation). In the course of denying protection for power
consumption records, however, an appellate court tipped its hand by noting that such
records, "unlike telephone or bank records, do not reveal discrete information about [the
defendant's] activities." State v. Kluss, 867 P.2d 247, 254 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
123. Illinois has adopted Katz's REP criterion, but diverges from federal doctrine by
finding a REP in telephone and bank records. People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (telephone records); People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 88-89 (Il. App.
Ct. 1983) (bank records). However, there is no REP in garbage left for collection. People
v. Stage, 785 N.E.2d 550, 552 (II1. App. Ct. 2003). In 2000 an appellate court held that a
canine sniff was a search requiring reasonable suspicion under the Illinois Constitution,
but the Supreme Court affirmed on other grounds. People v. Cox, 739 N.E.2d 1066, 1073
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000), affd, 782 N.E.2d 275 (111. 2002). In 2003 the Supreme Court of Illinois
did consider a canine sniff, holding that a sniff of the exterior of a vehicle during a routine
traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 203,
205 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005). Given that the United States Supreme Court
has vacated this holding via Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 838 (2005), perhaps the
Illinois courts will take this opportunity to decide the issue under the state constitution.
124. Montana has adopted Katz's REP criterion, State v. Scheetz, 950 P.2d 722, 724-25
(Mont. 1997), and agrees with federal doctrine that one has no REP in telephone numbers
dialed, Hastetter v. Behan, 639 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Mont. 1982). The state diverges,
however, with respect to information deemed more private, such as medical records, State
v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 448-50 (Mont. 1997) (medical records), and employment records,
Missoulian v. Bd. of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 970 (Mont. 1984)
(employment records); Mont. Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287-
88 (Mont. 1982) (same). Moreover, in Montana the state analog restricts police even
when there is no REP. Thus although a Montanan retains no REP in garbage left for
collection, police still must have reasonable suspicion before they can search such garbage.
State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 2005 MT 180, 9$9 18-19, 328 Mont. 10, $$ 18-19, 116 P.3d
800, $$ 18-19. A canine sniff of checked luggage is not a search under the state analog,
but a sniff of a vehicle exterior or of any other container still in a suspect's control is
permissible only if supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81, T 31,
315 Mont. 59, 'l 31, 67 P.3d 295, $ 31 (vehicle exterior); Scheetz, 950 P.2d at 727 (checked
luggage). Swabbing a hand to obtain a blood sample is a search for purposes of the
Montana Constitution, and the state high court has implied that shining an ultraviolet light
on a hand is likewise a search. See State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, $1$ 22-23, 307 Mont.
139, $ 22-23, 36 P.3d 900, $ T 22-23.







125. New Jersey has adopted a modified version of Katz's REP criterion, State v.
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 801-02 (N.J. 1990), but diverges from federal doctrine by finding a
REP in telephone numbers dialed, see State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1322 (N.J. 1989)
(telephone numbers dialed from motel room); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955-56 (N.J.
1982) (telephone numbers dialed), bank records, see State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 875
(N.J. 2005) (bank records), and garbage left for collection, see Hempele, 576 A.2d at 810
(garbage). Hempele is an articulate and well-reasoned opinion that has become the
standard for those states diverging from the federal rule for garbage. A New Jersey
appellate court recently held that a utility customer has a REP in power consumption
records. State v. Domicz, 873 A.2d 630, 644 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). The opinion
in Domicz provides a nice summary of New Jersey's relatively frequent departures from
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 642-43. An appellate court has also, however, agreed with
federal doctrine that a canine sniff of luggage does not constitute a search. See State v.
Cancel, 607 A.2d 199, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
126. Pennsylvania has adopted Katz's REP criterion, Commonwealth v. Rekasie, 778
A.2d 624, 628-29 (Pa. 2001), but diverges from federal doctrine by finding a REP in
telephone numbers dialed and bank records, Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254,
1258-59 (Pa. 1989) (telephone numbers); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291
(Pa. 1979) (bank records); see also Rekasie, 778 A.2d at 629-30 (explaining this
divergence). According to the Pennsylvania supreme court a bank customer does not,
however, have a REP in his or her name and address because it is impossible to live in
modern times "without repeated disclosure of [this information], both privately and
publicly." Commonwealth v. Duncan, 817 A.2d 455, 465-66 (Pa. 2003). Likewise, an
insured does not have a REP in information provided to his or her insurance company
pursuant to an arson investigation because the relationship is adversarial. Commonwealth
v. Efaw, 774 A.2d 735, 738-39 (Pa. 2001). The state constitution forbids warrantless one-
party consensual monitoring of a face-to-face conversation taking place in a suspect's
home, but not of telephone conversations or of face-to-face conversations in other
locations. See Rekasie, 778 A.2d at 631-32 (allowing such monitoring of telephone
conversation); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 708 A.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Pa. 1998) (plurality
opinion) (allowing such monitoring of face-to-face conversation taking place in defendant-
physician's medical office); Commonwealth v. Brion, 652 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 1994)
(forbidding such monitoring of face-to-face conversation in home); Commonwealth v.
Bender, 811 A.2d 1016, 1023 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (allowing such monitoring of face-to-
face conversation in vehicle). Pennsylvania diverges from federal doctrine with respect to
canine sniffs, requiring reasonable suspicion for a sniff of an object or location and
probable cause for a sniff of a person. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1190-91
(Pa. 2004).
127. Utah has adopted Katz's REP criterion, but, in its only definite departure from
the Fourth Amendment, has found a REP in bank records. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d
415, 416 n.2, 418 (Utah 1991). Utahans retain no REP in garbage left for collection, and
Utah is hesitant to depart from settled Federal Supreme Court jurisprudence. State v.
Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 546, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531,
536 (Utah 1994) (Stewart, J., concurring).
128. Washington's analog differs markedly from the Fourth Amendment, and
therefore the courts don't apply Katz's REP criterion. See State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151,
20061
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153-54 (Wash. 1984) (en banc). Instead Washington evaluates whether challenged
government conduct constitutes an unreasonable intrusion into a defendant's "private
affairs." Id. Washington diverges from federal doctrine on a number of issues, restricting
government access to garbage placed for collection, see State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112,
1116-17 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (garbage), vehicle location information, see State v.
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (location information via GPS tracking
device on vehicle), and telephone records, see State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash.
1986) (en banc) (telephone records); State v. Butterworth, 737 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1987) (unlisted telephone number). However, canine sniffs of certain objects,
including packages at a post office or bus terminal, are not restricted. State v. Stanphill,
769 P.2d 861, 865 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (post office); State v. Wolohan, 598 P.2d 421, 424-
25 (Wash Ct. App. 1979) (bus terminal). Four justices would restrict access to power
consumption records, but a majority (five) would not. In re Maxfield, 945 P.2d 196, 202,
205, 207 (Wash. 1997) (en banc). There is no protection for one's name, see State v.
Faydo, 846 P.2d 539, 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (name from telephone company records),
or for information in driver's license records, see State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 52 (Wash.
2002) (en banc) (suspicionless searches of driver's license records).
129. Alaska has adopted Katz's REP criterion. State v. Chryst, 793 P.2d 538, 539-40
(Alaska Ct. App. 1990). Although Alaska courts commonly state they might provide
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, there is little caselaw granting such
protection with respect to the third-party doctrine. Its courts have rejected the federal
doctrine of canine sniffs, holding that a canine sniff is a minimally intrusive search that
must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1311 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1985). And although an apartment owner has no REP in the contents of opaque
trash bags placed in an apartment dumpster, the court insinuated the rule would be
different for garbage placed for collection outside a single family home. See Smith v.
State, 510 P.2d 793, 795, 797-98 (Alaska 1973). Alaska also diverges from federal doctrine
by forbidding warrantless one-party consensual recording of a conversation taking place in
a suspect's home. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 875, 881 (Alaska 1978). Alaska courts have
found no REP in power consumption records and basic information (e.g., name and
address) required to subscribe to a service. Samson v. State, 919 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1996) (power consumption records); D'Antorio v. State, 837 P.2d 727, 734-35
(Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (name and basic account information from mail service records),
petition granted by 882 P.2d 1270 (Alaska 1994), remanded, 926 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1996);
Chryst, 793 P.2d at 542 (name and address from utility company records). The tenor of
these opinions, however, makes Alaska a probable rejecter: "Like my colleagues, I
conclude that [power consumption] records do not command the same privacy protection
as bank records." Samson, 919 P.2d at 173 (Mannheimer, J., concurring).
130. Until recently Arkansas had not diverged from the Fourth Amendment. See
Stout v. State, 898 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Ark. 1995) (recognizing no divergence); see also
Rikard v. State, 123 S.W.3d 114, 118-19 (Ark. 2003) (noting two divergences in 2002).
Arkansas has found no REP in garbage left for collection, id. at 119-20, and has not
otherwise departed from the federal third-party doctrine. Given its increasingly aggressive
state constitutional jurisprudence, however, and given that it appears never to have
considered whether it would follow the federal doctrine, Arkansas might diverge. See
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Burks v. State, No. CR 03-1276, 2005 WL 1358366 (Ark. June 9, 2005) (finding it
unnecessary to address whether a canine sniff constitutes a search); State v. Brown, 156
S.W.3d 722, 731 (Ark. 2004) (holding four to three that the state constitution, presumably,
unlike the Fourth Amendment, requires police to appraise a homeowner of his or her
right to refuse consent before performing a "knock and talk" consent search, even though
doing so required overruling the precedent of King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386 (Ark. 1977));
State v. Hamzy, 709 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Ark. 1986) (addressing Fourth Amendment
protection of telephone records). Arkansas jurisprudence is considered in more detail in
Part VI of this Article.
131. Indiana doesn't follow Katz's REP criterion. Rather than deciding whether
government conduct constitutes a search, Indiana moves right to deciding whether the
conduct was reasonable. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). In 1980
the Indiana supreme court unanimously adopted the reasoning and holding of Smith v.
Maryland, finding no REP in telephone records. In re Order for Ind. Bell Tel. to Disclose
Records, 409 N.E.2d 1089, 1090 (Ind. 1980). Despite the court's adoption of Smith,
however, it is not clear whether even the Fourth Amendment was asserted, let alone the
state analog. See id. Lower courts in Indiana and courts in sister states have nonetheless
interpreted the holding as articulating Indiana constitutional law. See, e.g., Bell v. State,
626 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J. 1982). In
1979 an Indiana appellate court likewise adopted United States v. Miller, finding no REP in
bank records. Cox v. State, 392 N.E.2d 496, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). Although the
defendant raised his state constitutional rights, there is no independent analysis of those
rights in the court's brief and conclusory opinion. See id. at 496. Lastly, Indiana courts
have, with little analysis, allowed a canine sniff under the state constitution. See, e.g., Rios
v. State, 762 N.E.2d 153, 160-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). If this were the only relevant
caselaw, despite its conclusory nature, one would not think Indiana a good candidate for
rejecting the federal third-party doctrine. But in the recent case of Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005), the Indiana supreme court unanimously held that a search of
garbage left for collection is reasonable, and hence constitutional, only if police have
articulable reasonable suspicion that the subjects of the search have engaged in violations
of law that might reasonably lead to evidence in the trash. Id. at 364. The court's analysis
makes it unlikely the court will continue to adhere to the conclusory and rigid applications
found in In re Order and Cox. Litchfield is considered in more detail in Part VI of this
Article.
132. Massachusetts has adopted Katz's REP criterion, Commonwealth v. Cote, 556
N.E.2d 45, 49 (Mass. 1990), and has found no REP in garbage left for collection, see
Commonwealth v. Krisco Corp., 653 N.E.2d 579, 584 (Mass. 1995) (finding REP in
garbage physically available only to garbage collector on the disposer's terms);
Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 567-68 (Mass. 1990) (holding there is typically no
REP in garbage left for collection), and business telephone records, see Commonwealth v.
Vinnie, 698 N.E.2d 896, 909-10 (Mass. 1998) (finding no REP in business telephone
records); Dist. Attorney for Plymouth Dist. v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 399 N.E.2d 866,
868 (Mass. 1980) (declining to decide whether state constitution restricts trap and trace
device); Commonwealth v. Feodoroff, 686 N.E.2d 479, 482-83 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)
(holding it is constitutional to access telephone records upon reasonable suspicion). An
appellate court has also held that a canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a search
for purposes of the state constitution. Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 815 N.E.2d 628, 633-
34 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004), affd, 833 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 2005). However, in Cote, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court indicated that it might diverge from the federal
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third-party doctrine despite finding no REP in messages left under another entity's
account with a third party answering service. Cote, 556 N.E.2d at 50; see also
Commonwealth v. Buccella, 751 N.E.2d 373, 383 n.9 (Mass. 2001) (recognizing potential
divergence again). Massachusetts has diverged from federal doctrine by forbidding
warrantless one-party consensual monitoring of conversations taking place in a suspect's
home, but it allows such monitoring of telephone conversations. See Commonwealth v.
Eason, 694 N.E.2d 1264, 1268 (Mass. 1998) (telephone); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507
N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Mass. 1987) (home). One should be wary of making too much of this
particular divergence, however, because even the United States Supreme Court has
provided special protection to the home that is arguably contrary to its third-party
doctrine. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (forbidding warrantless
thermal imaging of a home's exterior).
133. Although Minnesota has statutory restrictions on pen registers, location tracking,
and obtaining bank records, it does not appear to have decided whether the state
constitution restricts these activities. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.37 (West 2003) (pen
registers and location tracking); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13A.02 (West 2005) (bank records);
State v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 497, 505 & n.2 (Minn. 1985) (noting Wayne LaFave's criticism
of United States v. Miller in the course of holding, without mentioning the state
constitution, that a welfare recipient has no REP in an address given to welfare officials);
State v. Milliman, 346 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn. 1984) (applying United States v. Miller to
find no REP in bank records but without mentioning state constitution); State v. Benson,
484 N.W.2d 46, 50 & n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (noting Justice Marshall's dissent in Smith
v. Maryland and decisions in sister states rejecting the federal doctrine, but not deciding
the issue because it was not raised). Because the court has diverged from the Fourth
Amendment several times in recent years, and based on its recent divergence with respect
to canine sniffs, there is nonetheless reason to believe Minnesota will reject the federal
third-party doctrine. See State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 210 n.7, 212 (Minn. 2005)
(chronicling state divergence from Fourth Amendment and requiring reasonable suspicion
for canine sniff). Although there is some caselaw regarding garbage searches, see State v.
Dreyer, 345 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1984) (finding no REP based on State v. Oquist);
State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982) (finding no REP but conceding a
householder may sometimes have such an expectation without differentiating state
constitution); State v. Goebel, 654 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no
REP when trash is set on a curbside but without differentiating state constitution), only an
unpublished opinion clearly addresses the state constitution, see State v. Birdsall, No. C9-
02-1222, 2003 WL 21321419, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2003) (unpublished) (finding
no REP in garbage left for collection under state constitution).
134. New Hampshire has adopted Katz's REP criterion, State v. Goss, 834 A.2d 316,
318-19 (N.H. 2003), but it is fair to say the state burns both hot and cold with respect to the
federal third-party doctrine. One could therefore make an argument for placing it in an
altogether separate category (with Oregon), but with this caveat it sits well enough as a
"possible rejecter." New Hampshire has diverged from federal doctrine by finding a REP
in garbage left for collection, id. at 319, and by holding a canine sniff is a search, though
one that is constitutional if supported by reasonable suspicion, State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d
710, 716, 718-19, 726 (N.H. 1990) (issuing four separate opinions for the four justices; now
that New Hampshire has explicitly adopted Katz's REP criterion all four would agree a
canine sniff is a search, but only two justices held reasonable suspicion was adequate); see
also State v. Gonzalez, 738 A.2d 1247, 1252 (N.H. 1999) (declining to decide whether a
dog sniff of a package constitutes a search).
[Vol. 55:373
Learning from All Fifty States
Oregon'35
South Dakota'36
On the other hand, the state supreme court has also held there is no constitutional
restriction on the installation and use of pen registers. State v. Valenzuela, 536 A.2d 1252,
1262 (N.H. 1987). And in State v. Summers, 702 A.2d 819 (N.H. 1997), the court relied on
Valenzuela to quickly dismiss the argument that an officer obtaining medical information
from doctors constituted a search. Id. at 821; see also State v. Richter, 765 A.2d 687, 688
(N.H. 2000) (holding perusal of driver's license records does not constitute a search). New
Hampshire does not seem to have considered whether its state analog restricts
government access to bank records, presumably at least in part because access is restricted
by statute. Bank records can be obtained via administrative or judicial subpoena only if
advance notice is provided to the customer. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:8, C:10(1)
(1995). Bank records can be obtained without notice via search warrant or grand jury
subpoena. Id. § 359-C:9, :10(11).
135. Like New Hampshire, see supra note 134, Oregon burns both hot and cold with
respect to the federal third-party doctrine. Oregon rejects Katz's REP criterion;
government action is a search for purposes of the Oregon Constitution if it invades a
"privacy interest." State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Or. 1988). There does not
appear to be any caselaw regarding whether the state constitution restricts government
access to telephone or bank records, perhaps because they are both protected by statute.
See OR. REV. STAT. § 165.663 (2003) (requiring probable cause for installation of pen
register); Id. § 192.565 (requiring either customer notice or reasonable suspicion for access
to bank records); see also State v. Mituniewicz, 62 P.3d 417, 424 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(noting but not deciding whether installation of a pen register without probable cause
violated the state constitution). Oregon offers some protection for garbage left for
collection, but that protection is likely very weak. It seems that police must merely receive
the garbage of interest from the garbage collector rather than picking it up themselves.
Compare State v. Purvis, 438 P.2d 1002, 1004-05 (Or. 1968) (en banc) (police obtaining
trash from hotel maids did not constitute search), with State v. Galloway, 109 P.3d 383,
387-89 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (police taking trash bags from curbside was unconstitutional
seizure). Consistent with federal doctrine, a canine sniff conducted in a public place is not
a search, although more directed technologically-enhanced "sniffs" might constitute a
search. State v. Smith, 963 P.2d 642, 646-47 (Or. 1998). Oregon does offer significant
protection for location information, typically requiring a warrant to electronically track a
vehicle. Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1041. However, in a 1993 en banc appellate opinion the
court held, over a dissent, that there is no state constitutional protection for medical
records. State v. Gonzalez, 852 P.2d 851, 853, 855 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (en banc). The
court's language insinuates that there is no protection for any information voluntarily
conveyed to a third party. See id. at 855; State v. Binner, 886 P.2d 1056, 1058 n.1 (Or. Ct.
App. 1994) (interpreting Gonzalez broadly). But see Gonzalez, 858 P.2d at 858-59
(Warren, J., dissenting). Thus while there is some precedent indicating Oregon would
reject the federal third-party doctrine, the state high court would need to reject or limit
Gonzalez.
136. South Dakota rarely diverges from the Fourth Amendment, but there are signs
this may change. In State v. Schwartz, 2004 SD 123, 689 N.W.2d 430, a two-justice plurality
held a warrantless trash pull violated neither the Fourth Amendment nor its state analog.
Id. T 19, 689 N.W.2d at 436 (plurality opinion). Justice Konenkamp authored a
concurrence arguing that a decision on the merits was premature because the court had
yet to develop a jurisprudence of how to consider the state constitution independently of
the Fourth Amendment. See id. 31-56, 689 N.W.2d at 437-45 (Konenkamp, J.,
concurring in the result). Justice Zinter, one of the two justices in the plurality, agreed
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with this call to develop an interpretive methodology. See id. J 27, 689 N.W.2d at 437
(Zinter, J., concurring). And two justices dissented, arguing the state constitution did
recognize a REP in garbage left for collection and that a garbage pull typically requires a
warrant. See id. 58, 69, 689 N.W.2d at 445, 449 (Sabers, J., dissenting). Moreover, even
the plurality opinion stressed that the officer at issue "had articulable reasons for focusing
on the [defendants'] trash" and that "[t]his was not some police action on caprice or whim
or a random check of an entire neighborhood's garbage." Id. 19, 689 N.W.2d at 436
(plurality opinion). Because these concerns would be logically irrelevant if garbage
searches were completely unrestricted by the state constitution, even these two justices
might agree to a restriction on garbage searches like that adopted in Indiana. See supra
note 131. Thus the plurality did not hold that South Dakotans have no REP in garbage
left for collection, but rather only that "under these facts" the warrantless trash pulls were
"not unreasonable." Schwartz, 2003 SD 105, 19, 689 N.W.2d at 436 (plurality opinion).
Therefore, of the five justices on the South Dakota Supreme Court, two might agree
police need some reason for selecting the target of a garbage pull, one has taken no
position on the merits, and two believe a garbage pull typically requires a warrant. Given
this recent decision it is possible that South Dakota will develop an independent state
constitutional jurisprudence and begin to utilize its state analog more aggressively.
137. Although it is going on fifteen years since Texas declared that its analog might
not identically track the Fourth Amendment, see Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991), its only divergence remains dicta. In Richardson v. State, 865
S.W.2d 944, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc), the court rejected a lower court holding
that use of a pen register could never constitute a search, declaring that "the use of a pen
register may well constitute a 'search' under Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution." Id.
at 953. Because the calls at issue were made from a county jail while the defendant was in
pretrial detention, however, and because it was unclear how police had obtained certain
information, the court remanded for a determination of whether this defendant had a
REP. Id. at 953-54. On remand the lower court disposed of the case without addressing
whether one generally retains a REP in telephone numbers dialed. Richardson v. State,
902 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals'
language makes clear, however, that it would reject the federal doctrine with respect to
telephone numbers, and it has since reiterated this position. See Crittenden v. State, 899
S.W.2d 668, 673 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); Richardson, 865 S.W.2d at 951-53.
Even those declarations, however, are at least ten years old, and appellate courts have
adopted federal doctrine in two other contexts and questioned the vitality of Richardson
given ubiquitous Caller-ID. See Uresti v. State, 98 S.W.3d 321, 332 & n.6 (Tex. App. 2003)
(questioning Richardson and holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate an actual
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers dialed); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831,
845 (Tex. App. 1998) (holding canine sniff is not a search); State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516,
527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (finding no REP in results of blood-alcohol tests
taken after traffic accident); Hill v. State, 951 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding
canine sniff is not a search); Aitch v. State, 879 S.W.2d 167, 171-72 (Tex. App. 1994)
(questioning Richardson).
It is therefore unclear whether Texas's highest criminal court would still reject Smith.
Given this tenuous jurisprudence, a few other cases are worth noting. In Levario v. State,
964 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Tex. App. 1997) and Nilson v. State, 106 S.W.3d 869, 872-74 (Tex.
App. 2003), the courts found no REP in garbage left for collection, but without citing the
Texas Constitution. In Avelar v. State, No. 05-96-01550-CR, 1998 WL 169985 (Tex. App.
Apr. 14, 1998) (unpublished), the defendant raised the Texas Constitution but also
claimed the garbage at issue was not his, hence failing to demonstrate a REP. Id. at *1. In
Nored v. State, 875 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. App. 1994), a Texas court applied federal doctrine to
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the warrantless monitoring of a beeper attached to a bicycle, but again without addressing
the state constitution. Id. at 395-96. Such opinions are common in states in which there is
no divergence from the federal third-party doctrine. Lastly, in Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d
31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc), a three judge plurality held the Texas Constitution
gives greater protection to closed containers in vehicles. Id. at 41-42 (plurality opinion).
But that opinion has been criticized and abandoned, demonstrating that at least in that
context, Texas jurists have no overwhelming desire to diverge from federal doctrine. See
Trujillo v. State, 952 S.W.2d 879, 880-81 (Tex. App. 1997) (declining to follow Autran);
Madison v. State, 922 S.W.2d 610, 613 (Tex. App. 1996) (declining to follow Autran);
Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (criticizing analysis of
Autran).
138. Vermont diverges from the Fourth Amendment on a number of issues, and is not
shy about doing so. See State v. Geraw, 795 A.2d 1219, 1220 (Vt. 2002) (extending the
prohibition against electronic monitoring in the home to situations where the participant is
known to be a police officer); State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 101-02 (Vt. 1996) (expressing
willingness to diverge); State v. Kirchoff, 587 A.2d 988, 993-94 (Vt. 1991) (rejecting federal
open fields doctrine); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 120 (Vt. 1991) (rejecting federal
"good-faith" exception to exclusionary rule); State v. Savva, 616 A.2d 774, 779 (Vt. 1991)
(rejecting federal automobile doctrine); State v. Blow, 602 A.2d 552, 555-56 (Vt. 1991)
(forbidding warrantless electronic monitoring in the home by conversation participants);
State v. Wood, 536 A.2d 902, 905-07 (Vt. 1987) (rejecting federal standing doctrine). The
court has found a REP in garbage left for collection, Morris, 680 A.2d at 100, but has not
decided whether warrantless canine sniffs are permissible, State v. Cooper, 652 A.2d 995,
1001 (Vt. 1994) (holding defendant failed to properly raise state constitutionality of dog
sniff). Interestingly, Vermont courts do not appear to have ever cited Smith v. Maryland
or United States v. Miller, but given Vermont's strong emphasis on privacy and numerous
departures from the Fourth Amendment, it is a good candidate for rejecting the federal
third-party doctrine. Vermont has permitted warrantless access to prescription records,
but only because the pharmaceutical industry is pervasively regulated. State v. Welsh, 624
A.2d 1105, 1111-12 (Vt. 1992).
139. While there is essentially no caselaw concerning the third-party doctrine under
Arizona's Constitution, Arizona's only potential departure from the Fourth Amendment
seems to be in the context of warrantless entry to a home. See Petersen v. City of Mesa, 63
P.3d 309, 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing sole divergence), vacated on other grounds,
83 P.3d 35, 37 n.3 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc). One appellate court has held that neither the
state analog nor the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer from squeezing luggage and
smelling the air that emanates therefrom. See State v. Millan, 916 P.2d 1114, 1118 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995). It is not uncommon for states that have not diverged to have very little
relevant caselaw, because even when their courts consider relevant issues the state
constitution will not be raised or considered. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 941 P.2d 228, 232
(Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (holding canine sniff of luggage is not an unreasonable search
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without considering state constitution); State v. Fassler, 503 P.2d 807, 813-14 (Ariz. 1972)
(en banc) (finding no REP in garbage without considering state constitution); State v.
Cramer, 851 P.2d 147, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no REP in heat emitted from
home without considering state constitution). For the sake of brevity, this Article will not
always include such references. Hopefully defense counsel will begin to raise state analogs
in more cases in order to develop a more complete jurisprudence.
140. Connecticut typically interprets its analog to track the Fourth Amendment, and
despite several opportunities its courts have not diverged from the federal third-party
doctrine. In State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993), the court held one retains no
REP in garbage left for collection. Id. at 753. In several cases Connecticut courts have
followed Miller in finding no REP in bank records, see Morgan v. Brown, 592 A.2d 925,
929 (Conn. 1991) (finding no REP in bank records without mentioning state constitution);
In re Petition of State's Attorney, 425 A.2d 588, 590 (Conn. 1979) (same), but only one
unreported decision addresses the state constitution, see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Conn., Inc. v. Reuter, No. 26 10 11, 1990 WL 283861, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 11, 1990)
(unreported) (finding no REP in bank records under both state and federal constitutions).
In State v. Mordowanec, 788 A.2d 48 (Conn. 2002), the defendant asserted a REP in power
consumption records under the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution. Id. at 51.
Despite the issue having been raised for the first time on appeal, the court quickly
dismissed the issue on the merits. Id. at 56 n.11. Without differentiating the federal and
state provisions, it held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that he had a REP in
such records. Id. In State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132 (Conn. 2002), the court held a customer
has no reasonable expectation that a pharmacy will not disclose records upon law
enforcement request. Id. at 1152. Although the defendant asserted a violation of the state
analog, he articulated no reason why it would provide greater protection and therefore the
court declined to consider the matter. Id. at 1136 n.6. Finally, in State v. Waz, 692 A.2d
1217 (Conn. 1997), the court opted not to decide whether a canine sniff of mail is a search
for purposes of the state constitution because the existing reasonable suspicion would be
adequate even if it were. Id. at 1220; see also State v. Torres, 645 A.2d 529, 533 (Conn.
1994) (declining to decide whether a canine sniff of a vehicle constitutes a search where it
was supported by reasonable suspicion).
141. It appears that Delaware first diverged from the Fourth Amendment in 1999, and
has given no indication it will do so with respect to the federal third-party doctrine. See
Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 863-64 (Del. 1999) (rejecting federal Hodari D. standard for
seizure); Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199, 204 (Del. 1950) (terming the state analog and the
Fourth Amendment "substantively identical"); State v. Phillips, 366 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976) (same). In Mack v. State, 567 A.2d 34, No. 386, 1988, 1989 WL 90727
(Del. July 31, 1989) (unpublished table decision), the court adopted federal doctrine in
finding no REP in garbage placed in a public dumpster. Id. at *2.
142. Despite a state analog that includes explicit protection against unreasonable
"invasions of privacy," see LA. CONST. art. I, § 5, Louisiana has interpreted its analog to
provide protection equivalent to that of the federal third-party doctrine. Thus Louisiana
courts have found no REP in garbage left for collection, see State v. Strickland, 94-0025, p.
21 (La. 1111/96); 683 So. 2d 218,228-29; State v. Rando, 2003-0073, p. 8 n.3 (La. App. 4 Cir.
4/9/03); 848 So. 2d 19, 23 n.3, telephone numbers dialed, see State v. Pennison, 99-0466, pp.
9-10 (La. App. I Cir. 12/28/99); 763 So. 2d 671, 677; State v. Cain, 95-0054, pp. 9-10 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 2/27/96); 670 So. 2d 515, 520, or utility records, see State v. Niel, 93-1510, pp. 8-
9 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/4/94); 640 So. 2d 588, 594. Likewise canine sniffs of luggage, see State
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v. Alsay, 37,013, p. 8 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/14/03); 847 So. 2d 144, 149, and vehicle exteriors,
see State v. Barlow, 2000-1657, pp. 2-3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/27/01); 792 So. 2d 63, 64-65, are
not searches for purposes of the state constitution. A court has, however, noted in dicta
that the state constitution might prohibit warrantless electronic tracking of vehicles. See
State v. Peters, 546 So. 2d 829, 834 (La. Ct. App. 1989). Taken in context, this single
assertion, appealing though it is, seems too little to justify thinking Louisiana is likely to
diverge.
143. Michigan diverges from the Fourth Amendment only if there is "compelling
reason to do so," People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684, 693 (Mich. 1991) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting People v. Nash, 341 N.W.2d 439, 446 (Mich. 1983)), and there is no indication it
will diverge in the third party context. Indeed, although Michigan at one time diverged
from federal doctrine regarding one-party consensual monitoring in the home, it has since
changed its constitutional rule to match the federal counterpart. See id. at 698, overruling
People v. Beavers, 227 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. 1975). Michigan courts have found no REP in
garbage left for collection, see People v. Thivierge, 435 N.W.2d 446, 447 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988) (adopting federal doctrine for garbage), no REP in the results of blood-alcohol tests
taken for medical purposes following an automobile accident, see People v. Perlos, 462
N.W.2d 310, 313, 316 (Mich. 1990) (finding no REP in blood-alcohol tests), and no REP in
utility records, People v. McPhail, No. 192699, 1998 WL 1990357, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 28, 1998) (unreported) (finding no REP in utility records).
144. Although Nevada recently diverged from the Fourth Amendment with respect to
arrests for minor traffic violations, see State v. Bayard, 71 P.3d 498, 502-03 (Nev. 2003), the
state generally follows the Fourth Amendment and there is no reason to believe it will
diverge with respect to the third-party doctrine. Nevada courts have found no REP in
location information, see Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (permitting the
warrantless installation of a tracking device to an automobile), and have held a canine
sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a search, see Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010, 1014 n.4
(Nev. 1996) (permitting dog sniff of vehicle exterior).
145. Although New Mexico diverges from the Fourth Amendment on a number of
issues, there is no indication it will do so with respect to the third-party doctrine. In State
v. Reynolds, 890 P.2d 1315 (N.M. 1995), the court found no REP in a driver's license,
vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. Id. at 1318. In State v. Villanueva, 796 P.2d
252 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), the court held a canine sniff taking place at a border checkpoint
is not a search for purposes of the state analog. Id. at 256. Last but not least, an appellate
court took an extreme view of the federal third-party doctrine in State v. Barry, 617 P.2d
873, 876 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), abrogated in part on other grounds, State v. Wagoner, 2001-
NMCA-014, $ 35-36, 130 N.M. 274, 24 P.3d 306. According to Barry, by giving his garage
door opener to another person the defendant forfeited his REP in the contents of that
garage. Id. The opinion does not address the state constitution.
146. New York has followed the federal third-party doctrine as a matter of state
constitutional law, finding no REP in telephone and bank records. See People v. Guerra,
478 N.E.2d 1319, 1321 (N.Y. 1985) (no REP in telephone numbers dialed); People v. Di
Raffaele, 433 N.E.2d 513, 516 (N.Y. 1982) (no REP in telephone toll records); Norkin v.
Hoey, 586 N.Y.S. 2d 926, 931 (App. Div. 1992) (no REP in bank records). In New York a
canine sniff of the exterior of a home is a search requiring reasonable suspicion, see People
v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990), and a canine sniff of a person can constitute a
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search, see People v. Bramma, 655 N.Y.S. 2d 280, 281 (Dist. Ct. 1997). Neither decision is
necessarily contrary to federal doctrine. See United States v. Garcia-Garcia, 319 F.3d 726,
730 (5th Cir. 2003) (assuming a dog sniff of a person was a search); United States v.
Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding a canine sniff of apartment door was
a search). New York's highest court has stated a canine sniff of a package might constitute
a search, which would deviate from federal doctrine. See People v. Offen, 585 N.E.2d 370,
371-72 (N.Y. 1991).
147. Ohio diverged from the Fourth Amendment only when the Supreme Court's
decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), forced it to either diverge or
overrule its own existing precedent. See State v. Brown, 99 Ohio St. 3d 323, 2003-Ohio-
3931, 792 N.E.2d 175, at 5-7. Ohio is very hesitant to diverge, and there is no indication
it will do so with respect to the third-party doctrine. Courts interpreting the state
constitution have held one retains no REP in garbage left for collection, see State v. Payne,
662 N.E.2d 60, 61-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (garbage), and that a canine sniff of a vehicle
exterior is not a search, see State v. Waldroup, 654 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(canine sniff). In considering telephone numbers dialed, the Ohio Supreme Court stated
that the state analog is "virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment to the federal
Constitution and [we] refuse to impose greater restrictions under it." Ohio Domestic
Violence Network v. Pub. Utils. Comm., 638 N.E.2d 1012, 1019 n.3 (Ohio 1994).
148. Tennessee has diverged from the Fourth Amendment a few times, but there is no
indication it will do so with respect to the third-party doctrine. See State v. England, 19
S.W.3d 762, 766-67, 769 (Tenn. 2000) (holding, over a dissent, that canine sniff of vehicle is
not a search); State v. Pendergrass, No. 01CO1-9306-CR-00169, 1995 WL 108248, at *4
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 1995) (unpublished) (finding no reason to diverge from federal
doctrine with respect to telephone surveillance), rev'd on other grounds, 937 S.W.2d 834
(Tenn. 1996), substantive opinion adopted, No. 01CO1-9708-CR-00359, 1998 WL 846588
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 1998) (unpublished); State v. Bell, 832 S.W.2d 583, 589-91
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (adopting federal doctrine with respect to contents of a dumpster
outside a business establishment); State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370, 376-77 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1983) (finding no Fourth Amendment REP in medical records without addressing
state constitution).
149. Apart from a longstanding divergence based on the unique text of its analog, see
Smith v. State, 557 P.2d 130 (Wyo. 1976), Wyoming has interpreted that analog to mirror
the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 132. It has, however, recently become more willing to
undertake an independent state constitutional analysis. See Mogard v. City of Laramie, 32
P.3d 313, 315-17 (Wyo. 2001) (describing this transformation). This increased willingness
makes it tempting to place Wyoming in the "might reject" list, but because Wyoming has
yet to diverge, or even to imply that it likely will, the author has placed it here. A
willingness to hear argument is not a willingness to diverge. See, e.g., Almada v. State, 994
P.2d 299, 308-11 (Wyo. 1999) (undertaking independent state analysis but holding that,
like the Fourth Amendment, the state analog doesn't prohibit warrantless participant
monitoring); Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 483 (Wyo. 1999) (undertaking independent
state analysis but holding that, like the Fourth Amendment, the state analog doesn't
prohibit the search of an automobile incident to arrest). In Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604
(Wyo. 1993), the court, over a lengthy impassioned dissent, held that one has no REP in
telephone numbers dialed. Id. at 611-12. The court has yet to consider whether a bank
customer retains a REP in bank records or whether a canine sniff constitutes a search
because when those arguments were raised they were not adequately briefed. See Morgan
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v. State, 2004 WY 95, $ 26, 95 P.3d 802, 26 (Wyo. 2004) (canine sniff); Lafond v. State,
2004 WY 51, $ $ 56-58, 89 P.3d 324, 56-58 (Wyo. 2004) (bank records).
150. This category includes states that only diverge as to remedy. Several states reject
the federal "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Gary v. State, 422
S.E.2d 426, 427-29 (Ga. 1992) (rejecting the exclusionary rule as a matter of statutory
interpretation); State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Iowa 2000). Perhaps it is also worth
giving the caveat that while the author is fairly confident these states have not diverged
from the Fourth Amendment, the focus of the research was the third-party doctrine.
151. The Alabama supreme court recognizes that it has the authority to interpret its
state analog more expansively than the Fourth Amendment, but does not appear to have
done so. See, e.g., State v. Hill, 690 So. 2d 1201, 1207 n.3 (Ala. 1996). Alabama courts
commonly decide third party issues without mentioning the state constitution. See, e.g.,
Tims v. State, 711 So. 2d 1118, 1122-24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (results of blood-alcohol
test); Ex Parte Clark, 630 So. 2d 493, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (bank records);
Henderson v. State, 583 So. 2d 276, 291-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (telephone records),
affd sub nom. Ex Parte Henderson, 583 So. 2d 305 (Ala. 1991); Walls v. State, 536 So. 2d
137, 139 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (garbage); Gamble v. State, 473 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985) (canine sniff).
152. Georgia does not appear to have diverged from the substantive Fourth
Amendment, although it does reject the federal "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule as a matter of statutory interpretation. See State v. Gallup, 512 S.E.2d 66, 70 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999); Fox v. State, 509 S.E.2d 75, 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Gary v. State, 422
S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992)), rev'd on other grounds, 527 S.E.2d 847 (Ga. 2000); Galbreath v.
State, 443 S.E.2d 664, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). Georgia courts commonly decide third
party issues without mentioning the state constitution. See Kesler v. State, 291 S.E.2d 497,
504 (Ga. 1982) (telephone records); Scott v. State, 606 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(garbage); Lirousa v. State, 408 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Perkins v.
State, 398 S.E.2d 702, 703-04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Culpepper v. State, 274 S.E.2d
616, 617 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (bank records). Georgia courts have specifically adopted the
federal doctrine of canine sniffs. See Cole v. State, 562 S.E.2d 720, 722 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002) (canine sniff of vehicle exterior); O'Keefe v. State, 376 S.E.2d 406, 412 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (canine sniff of container).
153. Although Iowa rejects the federal "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule,
it has not diverged from the substantive Fourth Amendment. See State v. Carter, 696
N.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Iowa 2005) (recognizing authority to diverge but finding no basis to do
so); Prior, 617 N.W.2d at 268 (rejecting good-faith exception); State v. Kern, 690 N.W.2d
698, No. 03-1615, 2004 WL 1836220, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 28, 2004) (unpublished table
opinion) (recognizing identical protections); State v. Buchanan, 683 N.W.2d 126, No. 03-
0395, 2004 WL 893956, at *3 n,3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004) (unpublished table
opinion) (same); State v. Sefcik, No. 02-1801, 2004 WL 149958, at *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Jan. 28, 2004) (same). The courts have explicitly adopted federal doctrine for garbage
searches. See State v. Skola, 634 N.W.2d 687, 690-91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001).











154. Kansas has not diverged from the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Schultz, 850
P.2d 818, 823-24 (Kan. 1993). It has explicitly adopted federal doctrine as to garbage
searches, see State v. Alexander, 981 P.2d 761, 766 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999), telephone
numbers and bank records, see State ex rel. Brant v. Bank of Am., 31 P.3d 952, 954, 960
(Kan. 2001) (bank records); Schultz, 850 P.2d at 823-24 (telephone and bank records), and
canine sniffs, see State v. McMillin, 927 P.2d 949, 953 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (canine sniff of
vehicle exterior); State v. Daly, 789 P.2d 1203, 1209-11 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (canine sniff
of luggage).
155. Kentucky interprets its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See
Commonwealth v. Mobley, 160 S.W.3d 783, 784 (Ky. 2005); LaFollette v. Commonwealth,
915 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1996).
156. Maine interprets its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Patterson, 2005 ME 26, 10, 868 A.2d 188, 191; State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, l 9 n.3, 759
A.2d 1085, 1087 n.3.
157. Maryland's state analog currently lacks an exclusionary remedy, which
presumably discourages litigants from raising it as an alternative ground. See Fitzgerald v.
State, 837 A.2d 989, 1035 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003), affd, 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
There are, however, signs that this might change. See Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1019-20. To
date the state analog has been interpreted to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See Gadson
v. State, 668 A.2d 22, 26 n.3 (Md. 1995); Gahan v. State, 430 A.2d 49, 54 (Md. 1981);
Henderson v. State, 597 A.2d 486, 488 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). The state's highest
court recently chose not to consider whether a canine sniff of a home's exterior constitutes
a search for purposes of the state analog. See Fitzgerald, 864 A.2d at 1020-21. Although
the opinion gives reason to believe Maryland might reconsider its current lockstep
approach, its courts do not appear to have done so to date. See id. at 1019-21. Lastly,
although the case only concerns federal doctrine, it is worth noting that the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Smith v. Maryland affirmed the Maryland decision of Smith v.
State, 389 A.2d 858 (Md. 1978), aftd, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
158. Mississippi has interpreted its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See
Sasser v. City of Richland, 2002-KM-01641-COA (% 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003).
159. Missouri interprets its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).
160. Nebraska interprets its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See State
v. Vermuele, 453 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Neb. 1990). Thus its supreme court has held one
retains no REP in garbage left for collection. State v. Trahan, 428 N.W.2d 619, 622-23
(Neb. 1988). The court has also held that a canine sniff of a home's exterior is a search
requiring reasonable suspicion, but held this was so both under the Fourth Amendment
and the state constitution. State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 817 (Neb. 1999). This is not
necessarily incorrect as a matter of federal law. See discussion supra note 146.
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161. North Carolina has rejected the federal "good-faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule, State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 554 (N.C. 1988), but interprets its state
analog to substantively mirror the Fourth Amendment, see State v. Garner, 417 S.E.2d
502, 510 (N.C. 1992); In re Murray, 525 S.E.2d 496, 500 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). In State v.
Melvin, 357 N.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), the court held a bank customer has no REP
in bank records under the state analog. See id. at 381-82.
162. North Dakota's supreme court recognizes it could diverge from the Fourth
Amendment, State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 212 (N.D. 1988); State v. Stockert, 245
N.W.2d 266, 271 (N.D. 1976), but does not appear to have done so, see, e.g., State v.
Dodson, 2003 ND 187, $ $ 20-21, 671 N.W.2d 825, 832-33 (applying "good-faith" exception
to exclusionary rule). Typically the court fails to mention the potential for any divergence,
or merely applies the Fourth Amendment without mentioning the state analog. See, e.g.,
State v. Kesler, 396 N.W.2d 729, 735 (N.D. 1986) (holding canine sniff is not a search
without mentioning state constitution); State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826, 836-37 (N.D. 1982)
(holding one has no REP in telephone records without explicitly mentioning either
provision but citing decisions relying on Fourth Amendment); State v. Union State Bank,
267 N.W.2d 777, 779-81 (N.D. 1978) (holding bank customer has no REP in bank records
without considering state constitution until offhand reference at end of opinion). The
court has explicitly adopted federal doctrine with respect to searches of garbage left for
collection. State v. Carriere, 545 N.W.2d 773, 776 (N.D. 1996); State v. Rydberg, 519
N.W.2d 306, 310 (N.D. 1994).
163. Oklahoma does not appear to have diverged from the substantive Fourth
Amendment. See Sloan v. Sprouse, 1998 OK CR 56, $ 16, 968 P.2d 1254, 1258; Long v.
State, 706 P.2d 915, 916-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). The courts have held garbage left for
collection is not protected by the state constitution, Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985), but have not decided whether a canine sniff is a search under the
state analog, State v. McNeal, 2000 OK CR 13, 11 n.1, 6 P.3d 1055, 1058 n.1.; Scott v.
State, 927 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Okla. Crim. App. 1996). Although Oklahoma courts have
applied federal doctrine regarding bank records without mentioning the state constitution,
McAlpine v. State, 634 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981), one justice in a special
concurrence has alleged, this time without mentioning the federal doctrine, that the state
analog should protect bank records, Alva State Bank & Trust Co. v. Dayton, 755 P.2d 635,
637-38 (Okla. 1988) (Kauger, J., concurring).
164. Rhode Island will only consider whether its state analog might provide greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment if doing so is "strict[ly] necess[ary]." See State v.
McGoff, 517 A.2d 232, 235 (R.I. 1986). Currently the state interprets its analog to mirror
the Fourth Amendment; indeed it has abrogated previous deviations in order to conform
to federal doctrine. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A.2d 813, 816-17
(R.I. 1995) (explaining state constitutional jurisprudence); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010,
1013-14 (R.I. 1992) (abrogating a previous deviation); Thomas R. Bender, For a More
Vigorous State Constitutionalism, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 621, 670-73 (2005)
(same). The supreme court has declined to consider whether the state constitution
provides greater protection to either telephone or bank records. See McGoff, 517 A.2d at
235 (telephone records and telephone numbers dialed); Pontbriand v. Sundlun, 699 A.2d
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VI. A "REASONABLE" PROPOSAL
Technologies like cell phone location tracking and data mining
demonstrate the breadth of the federal third-party doctrine. Given
modern technology, if we retain no reasonable expectation of privacy in
what we give to others-even if limited to what we give to others for
their use-the Fourth Amendment provides little meaningful protection
from overzealous (or even merely curious) government officials. This
danger has not gone unnoticed. When the United States Supreme Court
169found no constitutional protection for bank records, Congress
856, 870 (R.I. 1997) (bank records). Although other potentially relevant decisions fail to
raise the state constitution, one court has held the state analog does not restrict
government access to prescription records. State v. Underwood, No. K2/98-0485A, 1999
WL 47159, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 1999) (unpublished).
165. South Carolina's analog explicitly forbids "unreasonable invasions of privacy,"
and the state supreme court has recognized it could grant greater protection than the
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Forrester, 541 S.E.2d 837, 840-41 (S.C. 2001) (quoting
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10). To date, however, it does not appear to have diverged. The state
has adopted the federal doctrine that one has no REP in telephone numbers dialed. See S.
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775,779-80 (S.C. 1991).
166. Virginia interprets its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See El-
Amin v. Commonwealth, 607 S.E.2d 115,116 n.3 (Va. 2005); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 337
S.E.2d 273, 274 n.1 (Va. 1985); Henry v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 796, 798 (Va. Ct.
App. 2000).
167. West Virginia interprets its state analog to mirror the Fourth Amendment. See
Rogers v. Albert, 541 S.E.2d 563, 569 (W. Va. 2000); State v. Duvernoy, 195 S.E.2d 631,
634 (W. Va. 1973); State v. Bruner, 105 S.E.2d 140, 146 (W. Va. 1958); State v. Andrews,
114 S.E. 257, 260 (W. Va. 1922). It has, however, expressed a willingness to diverge if
necessary in the context of interpreting what it deems to be ambiguous Fourth
Amendment rules. State v. Perry, 324 S.E.2d 354, 357 (W. Va. 1984).
168. The Wisconsin supreme court has cautioned that it will not act as a "rubber
stamp" in interpreting its own constitution vis-A-vis the Fourth Amendment, but it does
not appear to have diverged from federal doctrine. See State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, IT 59-
60, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 59-60, 604 N.W.2d 517, 59-60; State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311,
313 (Wis. 1992). Wisconsin has adopted federal doctrine with respect to garbage searches,
see State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 794-97 (Wis. 1985); State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App
16, I 13-19, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 13-19, 674 N.W.2d 894, IT 13-19, and bank records, see
State v. Swift, 496 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). An appellate judge has
encouraged the high court to interpret the state analog to provide greater protection from
canine sniffs. See State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, 26, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 26, 647 N.W.2d
348, 26 (Dykman, J., concurring), review denied, 2002 WI 121, 257 Wis. 2d 118, 653
N.W.2d 890.
169. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
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responded with statutory protection.7 0  When the Court subsequently4- • • 171
found no protection for telephone numbers dialed, Congress again
172responded with statutory protection . More recently, one of the most
controversial provisions of the USA Patriot Act' 73 has been section 215,
which establishes a procedure by which government agents can obtain
library and other records.174 Despite required judicial oversight and a
limitation to national security investigations, the provision has many
detractors and it appears that Congress will further restrict its use.17 5
Some critics might be surprised to learn that as a matter of federal law




But this rather bleak picture is brightened somewhat by the survey of
state doctrine. By the author's count eleven states reject the federal
third-party doctrine and ten others have given some reason to believe
they might reject it, for a total of twenty-one states. When considering
warrantless entry to the home, the Supreme Court deemed it significant
that fifteen states prohibited such entry, and three of those did so solely
on perceived federal constitutional grounds. 7 7 Moreover another eleven
170. See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (2000),
amended by 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (West Supp. 2005).
171. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
172. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
173. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 12, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 42,
49, and 50 U.S.C.).
174. See USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. 2002). The section
governs access to "any tangible thing," but library records have become the public focus.
See, e.g., Jason Krause, Out From the Stacks: Librarians Lead Legal Battles Over the
Patriot Act, Copyright, Tech Issues, A.B.A.J., Aug. 2005, at 14, 14; Shannon McCaffrey,
Librarians Angered Anew by Patriot Act, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 8, 2005, at A2; Michelle
Wallar, Library Tells Feds: Butt Out, DENVER POST, July 27, 2005, at 4B; Am. Civil
Liberties Union, Reform the Patriot Act: Section 215, http://action.aclu.org/reformthe
patriotact/215.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006); News Release, Am. Library Assoc.,
American Library Association (ALA) Announces Preliminary Findings of Study
Measuring Law Enforcement Activity in Libraries: Data Shows Law Enforcement Interest
in Library Records (June 20, 2005), http://www.ala.org/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=
News&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=96943.
175. See McCaffrey, supra note 174.
176. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)-(d). Section 215 does go beyond the absence of any
Fourth Amendment restriction by forbidding the recipient of an order from notifying the
target. Id. § 1861(d). But absent a law requiring such notification, recipients of third party
requests typically have no motivation to notify the true party in interest (apparently things
may be different when the government contacts an irate librarian, however). See
McCaffrey, supra note 174.
177. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598-99 (1980); see also supra note 14.
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states have diverged from the Fourth Amendment on some substantive
issue, indicating a willingness to critically consider federal doctrine.
Each diverging state has a unique jurisprudence. Those of Arkansas
and Indiana are worth describing in more detail. In 1995, Arkansas
rejected the invitation to diverge from the Fourth Amendment with a
mere paragraph:
Of course, we could hold that the Arkansas Constitution
provides greater protection against unreasonable searches than
does the Constitution of the United States, but we see no
reason to do so. The wording of each document is comparable,
and through the years, in construing this part of the Arkansas
Constitution, we have followed the Supreme Court cases....
[W]e choose to continue to interpret "unreasonable search" in
[our state analog] in the same manner the Supreme Court
interprets the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.17 s
The court reiterated this lockstep approach in December 1999.179
But a mere two months later the court stumbled into a disagreement
with federal doctrine over the admissibility of drugs found in a vehicle
driven by Kenneth Sullivan. is0 When Sullivan pulled into a service
station an officer followed, allegedly because Sullivan had been traveling
forty miles an hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone. 81 The officer had
been assigned to the narcotics section, and upon seeing Sullivan's license,
suspected he was involved with illegal drugs.1 82  When the officer
requested vehicle registration and proof of insurance, Sullivan opened
his vehicle's driver's-side door, revealing a rusting roofing hatchet on the
floorboard.8 3  The officer arrested Sullivan for speeding, lacking
registration and proof of insurance, carrying a weapon (the rusting
hatchet), and "having an improper tint on his windshield."'' 4  An
178. Stout v. State, 898 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Ark. 1995) (citation omitted). The court
deemed it "especially appropriate" to follow the federal doctrine regarding automobile
searches incident to arrest because that doctrine had proved workable for fourteen years.
See id.
179. See Rainey v. Hartness, 5 S.W.3d 410, 415 (Ark. 1999) ("Article 2, § 15, of the
Arkansas Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment, and we interpret it
in the same manner as the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth
Amendment.").
180. State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d 526, 526-27 (Ark. 2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
181. Id. at 526.
182. Id. at 527.
183. Id. at 526.
184. Id.
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inventory search of the vehicle located a black bag under the armrest
that contained drugs and drug paraphernalia. 
85
As evidenced by its description of Sullivan, a "now-disabled,
previously self-employed roofer," the Supreme Court of Arkansas
sympathized with the defendant. 86 The court unanimously suppressed
the drug evidence, relying on a 1932 United States Supreme Court
decision stating that "'an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for
evidence."' 1 Because the court believed its decision was dictated by the
Fourth Amendment, there was no mention of the state constitution.
Only upon the state's petition for rehearing was the court asked to
consider the much more recent precedent of Whren v. United States,'8 in
which the United States Supreme Court rejected just such a doctrine of
pretextual arrests. 1 9 But the Arkansas supreme court had taken a stance,
and four of its justices would not so easily be deterred. In an opinion
penned by Chief Justice W.H. "Dub" Arnold, a majority of four justices
characterized much of Whren as dicta and asserted that Whren's limited
holding was not contrary to the court's own decision.' 9° It is the court's
rather remarkable next step, however, which most of us will remember.
The court inexplicably asserted that "even if we were to interpret Whren
to give full rein to law enforcement to effect pretextual arrests for traffic
violations, there is nothing that prevents this court from interpreting the
U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court,
which has the effect of providing more rights."' 9' Having disposed of the
case on Fourth Amendment grounds (albeit on a unique Arkansas
interpretation thereof), the court again made no mention of the state
constitution.
The United States Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion
both granting certiorari and rejecting the creative interpretation of
185. Id. at 527.
186. Id. at 526. The trial court empathized with the defendant in a very personal way:
"'I've got a hammer under the seat of my car today. Am I subject to being arrested and
taken physically into custody because I have a hammer?"' State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d
551, 554 (Ark. 2000) (Glaze, J., dissenting).
187. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d at 527 (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467
(1932)).
188. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
189. See id. at 812-13; Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d at 551 (supplemental opinion on denial of
rehearing).
190. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d at 551-53. Three justices dissented. See id. at 553, 555 (Glaze,
J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 552 (majority opinion).
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Whren.'92 Naturally it also rejected Arkansas's "alternative holding" that
a state is free to interpret the Fourth Amendment differently than the
United States Supreme Court.
193
It was in this context that the Arkansas supreme court first diverged
from the Fourth Amendment as a matter of state constitutional law.
Less than a year after the court's embarrassing reversal, and while it was
considering the case on remand, the court interpreted its state analog to
provide greater protection against nighttime warrantless incursions upon
private property.'94 Two and a half months later the court issued its
opinion in Sullivan, 95 this time rejecting pretextual arrests under the• . . 96
state constitution. And in State v. Brown, 97 the court diverged again,
limiting "knock and talk" consensual home searches.
8
Brown demonstrates just how far the pendulum has swung. Not only
were four justices willing to again diverge from the Fourth Amendment,
but they were willing to overrule their own precedent to the contrary.199
In the words of Justice Brown, writing for the court, "[we have] made it
abundantly clear that though the search-and-seizure language of [our
state analog] is very similar to the words of the Fourth Amendment, we
are not bound by the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
when interpreting our own law. ',200 His court has indeed "embrac[ed] the
192. Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001). The Court quite appropriately
deemed Arkansas's holding to be "flatly contrary to this Court's controlling precedent."
Id.
193. Id. at 772.
194. Griffin v. State, 67 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Ark. 2002). The split was tentative, because
the court felt "the late-night intrusion upon [defendant's] property may have also violated
the provisions of federal constitutional law." Id. This means the court's decision to
diverge was unnecessary, and therefore all the more noteworthy. Despite this seeming
desire to avoid even the potential for another reversal, the court was admirably forthright
with respect to its former error in constitutional interpretation. See id. at 585. While
presumably unrelated, Chief Justice Arnold resigned shortly thereafter to resume private
practice. See Steve Barnes, National Briefing South: Arkansas: Chief Justice Quits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2,2003, at A29.
195. State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215 (Ark. 2002).
196. Id. at 216.
197. 156 S.W.3d 722 (Ark. 2004).
198. Id. at 732 (requiring a homeowner be informed of his or her right to refuse
consent).
199. See id. (Glaze, J., dissenting), overruling King v. State, 557 S.W.2d 386 (Ark.
1977).
200. Id. at 727 (majority opinion). The Arkansas court of appeals recently decided
five to four not to diverge from federal search incident to arrest doctrine in the context of
automobiles. See McDonald v. State, No. CACR 03-957, 2005 WL 1473656 (Ark. Ct. App.
June 22, 2005). One dissenter chided the majority for failing to recognize "the fact that
our supreme court tends to interpret [the state analog] in a manner that provides greater
protection to the people of this state than the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. (Hart, J., dissenting).
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new judicial federalism with a commitment and panache not previously
seen in Arkansas jurisprudence.
2 0 1
This bumpy (and even bumbling) jurisprudence probably contains
many lessons, among them the well-known mantra that "good facts" can
make all the difference, especially when encouraging a court to depart
from the Fourth Amendment for the first time. Obviously a bit of luck
won't hurt either-if members of the Arkansas court had not already
entrenched themselves, they almost certainly would have been less
willing to diverge. 2 2 For those cheering the demise of the federal third-
party doctrine, however, it is encouraging to see a state move from a
"lockstep" jurisprudence to one of potentially considerable
independence in just a few years.
Of course merely deciding to diverge leaves an entire jurisprudence to
develop. Perhaps in part for reasons of judicial restraint, states rejecting
federal doctrine have tended to be haphazard in developing an alternate
jurisprudence. Thus Arkansas' first foray into departing from federal
doctrine gave little indication of when such departures should be
expected; its second focused on whether the state had traditionallyS 203
viewed an issue differently than its federal counterparts. For those
diverging from the federal third-party doctrine, is all information in the
hands of third parties protected? Must police have the same quantum of
suspicion and undertake the same legal process to obtain all types of
information? A recent decision by a potential rejecter, Indiana, offers a
jurisprudence that does not provide all the answers, but at least asks the
right question.
As part of its perennial efforts to stem the cultivation and use of illegal
drugs, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) peruses High
Times, a publication for marijuana growers. Although the articles are
undoubtedly stimulating, the DEA reads for information on advertisers,
201. Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United States
Supreme Court Shows State Courts the Way, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 499, 499 (2002).
Of course not everyone is fond of this newfound panache; three justices issued a vigorous
dissent in Brown. See Brown, 156 S.W.3d at 732 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
202. Two of the three justices that dissented before Sullivan went to the United States
Supreme Court also dissented from granting greater protection under the state analog.
See State v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 222 (2002) (Glaze, J., dissenting); State v. Sullivan, 16
S.W.3d 551, 553 (Ark. 2000) (Glaze, J., dissenting). The third was no longer on the court
as his temporary appointment had expired. See Ascending the Bench, Under the Radar,
ARK. TIMES, July 6, 2001, at 8 (discussing Justice Smith).
203. See Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d at 218.
204. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005).
205. Id. at 357. The reader can peruse High Times' website at http://www.hightimes.
com (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). In the spirit of this Article, however, one should keep in
mind that the Fourth Amendment provides no restraint on law enforcement obtaining a
list of websites you visit from your ISP. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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which it subpoenas in order to obtain their customer lists.20 6 These lists
are then turned over to state and local law enforcement.0 7 In this
manner the Indiana State Police were provided the name and address of
Patrick Litchfield, who had purchased items from Worm's Way.
20 8
Based on this tip the state police performed two garbage pulls at the
Litchfield residence, removing several opaque bags that had been left for
collection.20 9 When a search of these bags revealed, inter alia, marijuana
stems, seeds, and leaves, police obtained a warrant to search the home.
The resulting search located fifty-one marijuana plants growing on the
back deck.'
According to the federal third-party doctrine, a homeowner retains no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection, and
therefore trash pulls are not "searches" restricted by the Fourth
212Amendment. The Litchfields therefore did not challenge the garbage
pulls under the Fourth Amendment, but instead relied upon Indiana's
analog.211 The Indiana Supreme Court had previously deemed
214warrantless garbage pulls to be constitutional, but it was over a dissent.
And, presumably even more encouraging to the Litchfields, the Chief
Justice had recused himself from those proceedings based on his own
experience as the target of a garbage pull seeking evidence of marijuana
215
use.
Textually Indiana's analog is virtually identical to the Fourth
Amendment, 21 6 but the state rejects the federal reasonable expectation of
privacy criterion. Instead, true to the text of both the Fourth
206. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 357.
207. Id. A customer provides this information for the company's use, so it definitely
receives no Fourth Amendment protection. Remarkably, a customer would therefore
have no Fourth Amendment claim even if the DEA stole this information from the
advertisers. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1980).
208. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 357. Worm's Way is available at http://www.wormsway.
com (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
209. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 358.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
213. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359.
214. Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 541, 543 (Ind. 1994).
215. See id. at 543 (indicating that Chief Justice Shepard did not participate); Judge
Checks Out Colleague's Trash, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1994, at A10. Chief Justice Shepard has
been credited with triggering the "modern era in Indiana constitutional law" via his 1989
law review article. Jon Laramore, Indiana Constitutional Developments: The Wind Shifts,
36 IND. L. REV. 961, 961 (2003). This claim is, of course, somewhat self-serving as it
appears in a later volume of that same journal. See id. (citing Randall T. Shepard, Second
Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575 (1989)).
216. See infra Appendix.
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Amendment and its state analog, Indiana moves immediately to whether
the challenged action was reasonable.2 7 And, true to the contextual
nature of that term,2 8 the court evaluates the reasonableness of the
challenged police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.2 9
One of those circumstances is "the basis upon which the [police]
selected the subject of the search or seizure. ' '220 This is sensible, and the
United States Supreme Court has also considered this circumstance
under the Fourth Amendment. 22 ' Because of its stubborn insistence that
one retains no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage, however,
and that rifling through garbage is therefore not a "search," the United
States Supreme Court leaves police free to trample all over this
limitation.22 Not so in Indiana, where a unanimous Litchfield court held
221that reasonable police conduct requires satisfying the Terry standard .
In Indiana, an officer wishing to search garbage left for collection must
have an articulable basis justifying reasonable suspicion that (1) the
subjects of the search (meaning the source of the garbage) have engaged
in violations of law and that (2) those violations might reasonably lead to
evidence being located in that trash.224
Because the record did not specify whether Litchfield had responded
to an advertisement in High Times, or was merely an independent
customer of Worm's Way, the Indiana supreme court remanded for a
determination whether this standard was satisfied. 25 But even if police
had reasonably suspected Litchfield, could they race to his home with
lights ablaze and sirens wailing and pick through his garbage while his
nosy neighbors looked on with glee? Once again the federal third-party
217. See Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359. "'Because we read this section of our
constitution as having in its first clause a primary and overarching mandate for protections
from unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of the official behavior must
always be the focus of our state constitutional analysis."' Id. at 361 (quoting Moran, 644
N.E.2d at 539).
218. The first definition of "reasonable" in one dictionary is "agreeable to reason or
sound judgment; logical." WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1197 (1989).
219. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 359 (citing Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 539).
220. Id. at 360.
221. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990) (citing Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)) (contrasting unacceptable discretionary stops and
constitutional roadblocks).
222. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988).
223. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 364.
224. Id. Although Indiana courts always consider the constraints upon the
government actor, this does not mean there must always be individualized suspicion. The
supreme court has permitted random drug testing of middle and high school students. See
id. at 360 (discussing Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972, 985 (Ind. 2002)).
225. Id. at 364.
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doctrine dictates that the Fourth Amendment likely has nothing to say-
the action is neither a search nor a seizure, so police are unrestrained .
Not so in Indiana, where reasonable police conduct requires that police
retrieve the garbage in substantially the same manner as the trash
collector would take it.
227
So not only should states reject the federal third-party doctrine, but
they should reject its underlying construct as well, the reasonable
expectation of privacy. As articulated by a unanimous United States
Supreme Court in 2001:
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,
and the reasonableness of a search is determined "by assessing,
on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.
228
Or, in the words of the Indiana supreme court, "a court should 'weigh the
nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes, the
character of the intrusion that is complained of, and the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern.'
229
One might counter that the Indiana result could just as well have been
reached under the reasonable expectation of privacy (REP) framework.
A court first determines that, contrary to the holding of the United States
Supreme Court, one does retain a REP in garbage left for collection.
This would not be a strange result, especially if a court adopted a REP
definition like that proposed by Professor Amsterdam:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the
226. Moreover it is not clear whether the United States Supreme Court would
consider this factor relevant even were the conduct deemed a Fourth Amendment search.
The Court has, however, sometimes considered the manner of acquisition. See Illinois v.
Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 844-45 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (collecting cases and
arguing that a canine sniff of an automobile should be restricted by the Fourth
Amendment because it is intimidating and adversarial, changing the entire character of
the encounter).
227. See Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 363-64 ("The police need not go to the lengths
elaborated in [a previous appellate opinion], where police rode in the trash pickup and
searched [the garbage] only after it was taken by its usual collectors. But police do need to
ensure that they do not cause a disturbance or create the appearance of a police raid of the
residence.").
228. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). The Court went on to explain that "[allthough the
Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term
'probable cause,' a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable." Id. at 121.
229. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 360 (quoting Nw. Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d at 979).
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police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional
restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the
aims of a free and open society.
The court would then go on to apply the reasonableness criterion
required by the state analog. Although this would be preferable to the
actual federal holding, and some states have so held,231 the redundant use
of "reasonable" is unnecessary and even confusing.
Consider the recent decision by the Supreme Court of Montana in
232
State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup. As in Litchfield, the issue was whether
the state analog restricts garbage pulIs.233  Montana has adopted the
federal REP criterion, so the court first considered whether the
defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash, and,
234
if so, whether it was one society was willing to consider reasonable. In
Montana, as in federal law, "where no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists, there is neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' within the contemplation
of [the constitutional provision].
The court held that the defendant had abandoned his garbage, and
therefore retained no subjective expectation of privacy in its contents.
236
Moreover, even if he had retained a subjective expectation, it was an1i 37
expectation that society would not consider reasonable. Hence the
garbage pull was neither a search nor a seizure for purposes of the
Montana Constitution. 238 That should, of course, end the matter-there
is no constitutional restriction on garbage pulls in Montana.
In an illogical twist (though not, alas, one without precedent
elsewhere), the Montana supreme court nonetheless went on to adopt
230. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 403 (1974); see also People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. 1985) (en banc)
(adopting Amsterdam's formulation); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 802 (N.J. 1990)
(same); State v. Nagel, 880 P.2d 451, 454 (Or. 1994) (in banc) (same); State v. Morris, 680
A.2d 90, 93-94 (Vt. 1996) (same); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 7, § 2.1(d) (same).
231. See, e.g., People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971) (in banc) (finding a
REP in garbage left for collection), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972); State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d
1274, 1276-77 (Haw. 1985) (same); Hempele, 576 A.2d at 810 (same).
232. 2005 MT 180, 328 Mont. 10, 116 P.3d 800.
233. Id. 2.
234. Id. $$ 9-10.
235. Id. 9.
236. Id. 15.
237. Id. l 16.
238. Id. 17.
239. Hawaii has a similar jurisprudence for canine sniffs. See State v. Snitkin, 681 P.2d
980, 983-84 (Haw. 1984) (holding a canine sniff is not a search but nonetheless subjecting it
to a reasonableness inquiry); State v. Groves, 649 P.2d 366, 371-73 (Haw. 1982) (same).
Catholic University Law Review
the requirements of Litchfield.4°  In attempting to justify these
requirements the court seemed to take great pains to avoid the
constitutional requirement that searches be "reasonable," presumably
because the court had just finished explaining why a garbage pull was,
despite all common sense to the contrary, not a search. According to the
Montana supreme court, "the public would [not] be entirely comfortable
with," nor "embrace the idea of," unrestrained garbage pulls. T4 Thus,
given the "unique" nature of garbage, it "seems only fair" that garbage
pulls be constrained, and therefore the court "deem[ed] it appropriate"
242to adopt the Litchfield criteria.
If Montana's rather unique jurisprudence is representative of the
clarity to be gained by avoiding complete reliance on the term
"reasonable," it does not highly commend itself.2 43 Instead, it is the
Indiana model that openly allows for the nuanced, context-specific
determinations that are essential in the modern world. Garbage pulls are
an important and legitimate source of evidence, but they are also quite
invasive. Hence in Indiana their use is restricted. But requiring a
warrant supported by probable cause would typically be prohibitive,
because it is often the garbage pull that provides probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed.'" Moreover, a warrant can
authorize police to search the home itself, a location that should receive
greater protection than the garbage one leaves for collection. In short, it
seems the Indiana supreme court got this one exactly right.
The same spectrum of protection is necessary in more typical third
party contexts. Just as with garbage, it would be unreasonable for police
to arbitrarily look through the names of those you telephone. And
police certainly should be prohibited from arbitrarily listening in on
telephone conversations. But it would defy logic to require police to
have the same quantum of suspicion before engaging in these very
different activities. By statute telephone activity receives multi-tiered,
245though perhaps inadequate, protection. On account of the federal
240. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 2005 MT 180, f 18, 328 Mont. 10, $ 18, 116 P.3d 800, T 18.
241. Id.
242. Id. The court only gives in and reverts to the term "reasonable" when it begins
describing the Litchfield decision. See id. $ 19.
243. Two justices in dissent inveighed against the majority's "internally incoherent"
opinion. Id. 9 39 (Leaphart, J., dissenting).
244. This was true in Litchfield and 1993 Chevrolet Pickup. Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 358 (Ind. 2005); 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 2005 MT 180, 91 3-4, 328 Mont. 10, 91
3-4, 116 P.3d 800, 191 3-4.
245. Federal law allows access to dialing information upon a mere certification "that
the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18
U.S.C. § 3122 (2000). Perhaps the applicant should at least have to articulate the reasons
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third-party doctrine, telephone activity receives only binary
constitutional protection: no protection for dialing information,246 but
significant protection for content information.247
Obtaining different types of information from different types of third
parties should require different quanta of suspicion and different
processes. Although administrability might favor a constitutional
provision that provides either bright-line or no protection in every
circumstance, that can only be achieved at the significant cost of illogical,
or extremely limited, application. A requirement of a subpoena or
reasonable suspicion for all third party information gives little protection
to medical records or location tracking. A requirement of probable
cause for all third party information is unacceptable to legitimate law
enforcement. But this does not mean every case will unpredictably
depend upon its own particular facts. Just as the Supreme Court and the
fifty states have managed to develop a jurisprudence that entrance to the
home is typically forbidden absent a warrant supported by probable
cause, so courts unshackled from the third-party doctrine can develop a
jurisprudence regulating both traditional access to third party
information (including garbage, medical records, telephone records,
utility records, and bank records) and technologically enhanced access to
third party information (including canine and mechanical sniffs of
containers, vehicles, homes, and persons).
There is an entire spectrum of protections from which a court can
select. These protections range along at least two axes, quantum of
suspicion and process, and courts will have to select at least one set of
coordinates for each relevantly different type of information. For the
first a court might choose among no suspicion, 48 a "likely to be relevant"
standard, reasonable suspicion, "probable cause" defined as fair
probability, "probable cause" defined as likely, or even some higher
standard. For the second a court might choose among requiring no
process, requiring internal approval from specified personnel, requiring a
subpoena, requiring a subpoena with grand jury pre-clearance, requiring
delayed notice to the true party in interest, requiring advanced notice to
the true party in interest, requiring a certification to a court, or requiring
a substantive showing to a court. Perhaps it is reasonable to obtain
power consumption records and a DNA fingerprint based only on
reasonable suspicion, and to obtain garbage and telephone dialing
for that belief. The content of telephone conversations receives significant protection
under the Federal Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
246. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
247. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967).
248. Even no suspicion might be reasonable for information as commonplace as name
and address. See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 817 A.2d 455,465-66 (Pa. 2003).
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records on reasonable suspicion and administrative approval, but to
obtain medical records or location tracking would require a substantive
showing of probable cause. For certain types of information it might be
reasonable to permit law enforcement an option. Perhaps it is
reasonable for police to access bank records on reasonable suspicion so
long as they provide advanced notice to the customer, but also
reasonable to obtain such records without notice if police are willing to
make an advanced showing of probable cause.249 Perhaps delayed notice
is reasonable upon reasonable suspicion of criminality and reasonable
suspicion of obstruction of justice.
This Article will not attempt to articulate a matrix of such
requirements, and perhaps such a matrix is best composed over time as
actual constitutional controversies are presented to the courts. In those
states having diverged from the federal third-party doctrine this process
is already underway. For given information, say telephone numbers
dialed, some courts merely require reasonable suspicion 250 while others
251require only a minimal process. ' Other courts require some judicial or
grand jury proceeding, 2 and still others require a traditional warrant
supported by probable cause.253 Nor have courts limited themselves to
249. Several states provide such an option by statute. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
7475, 7476(b)(1) (West 1995 & Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-43(a) (West
2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-C:8 to -C:10 (1995). While New Jersey recently held
its constitution permits access to bank records via grand jury subpoena without customer
notice, the court exercised its supervisory authority over grand juries to charge a
committee to investigate whether notice should be required. See State v. McAllister, 875
A.2d 866, 878 (N.J. 2005). Federal legislation enacted in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Miller sometimes requires customer notice, but it can be omitted for cause and
grand jury subpoenas never require notice. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3407, 3409, 3413(i) (2000).
Florida has a similar scheme for access to medical records, allowing law enforcement
access via warrant without notice or via subpoena with notice. See Limbaugh v. State, 887
So. 2d 387, 393-95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). The Federal Stored Communications Act
offers a similar choice for obtaining certain content information. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)
(2000 & Supp. 2002).
250. See, e.g., Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151-52 (Fla. 1989) (requiring
reasonable suspicion for pen registers). Several states also require reasonable suspicion
for canine sniffs. See, e.g., Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985);
People v. Unruh, 713 P.2d 370, 379 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d
199, 212 (Minn. 2005); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 717-18 (N.H. 1990).
251. See, e.g., Greer v. N.J. Bureau of Sec., 671 A.2d 1080, 1086 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996) (permitting access via administrative subpoena).
252. See, e.g., People v. Blair, 602 P.2d 738, 746-47 (Cal. 1979) (in banc) (requiring
judicial approval); People v. Larkin, 239 Cal. Rptr. 760, 762 (Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (same);
People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1282-83 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (allowing grand jury
subpoena); People v. Jackson, 452 N.E.2d 85, 89 (I11. App. Ct. 1983) (same).
253. See, e.g., State v. Rothman, 779 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Haw. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760
P.2d 1162, 1167 (Idaho 1988); Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1258-59 (Pa.
1989). Several states also typically require a warrant supported by probable cause for
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such traditional offerings. In Colorado, for example, bank records can be
obtained via a prosecutor's subpoena, but only if that subpoena is
supported by probable cause.25 4
These rather fine distinctions may seem to require a lot of the Fourth
Amendment and its state analogs, thereby leaving considerable
discretion and hard work to the courts. It would be a grave error to
minimize the difficulty of crafting a useable matrix, or the discomfort
some may have with "finding" such a detailed requirement in a
constitutional provision. The multipronged Miranda warning seems
simple in comparison. The author shares this concern, and is open to
further thought and scholarship on the issue. One saving grace may be
that such decisions can be made without requiring discretion and hard
work on the part of police officers in the field. Once a court requires a
given quantum of suspicion and/or a given procedure to obtain a certain
type of information, officers (and attorneys) will have clear guidance.
Ultimately, given modern technology and social norms, the author is not
aware of any acceptable substitute for nuanced constitutional privacy
protections. Not only does modern society make it impossible to limit
personal information to the home, but modern technology can peer into
that home. Any meaningful protection will include information in the
hands of, or available to, third parties. While legislative determinations
are certainly relevant to what is reasonable, and may be good policy
where the constitutional restraints are deemed minimal, it is, to borrow a
phrase, the courts' "duty ... to say what the law is." '255 In a world in
which we give so much information to third parties, piecemeal statutory
protection is insufficient.
It is encouraging that many states have parted course with the United
States Supreme Court with respect to the third-party doctrine, and that
others seem inclined to follow. There is, however, work left to do, and
location tracking via government transmitter or for garbage pulls. See People v. Oates,
698 P.2d 811, 818 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (transfer of goods containing electronic beeper);
State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Haw. 1985) (garbage); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d
793, 813 (N.J. 1990) (garbage); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988) (location
tracking via radio transmitter on vehicle); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 220 (Wash. 2003)
(en banc) (location tracking via GPS device on vehicle).
254. See People v. Mason, 989 P.2d 757, 759-60 (Colo. 1999). Colorado's requirements
are less stringent, however, for grand jury and administrative subpoenas. See id. at 761-62;
People v. Lamb, 732 P.2d 1216, 1220-21 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); Charnes v. DiGiacomo,
612 P.2d 1117, 1122, 1123 n.12 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); see also State v. McAllister, 875
A.2d 866, 867-68 (N.J. 2005) (allowing access to bank records via grand jury subpoena).
Montana permits access to medical records via subpoena but similarly requires probable
cause. See State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 448-50 (Mont. 1997). Illinois requires probable
cause if the information sought is deemed to be intimately personal. See In re May 1991
Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 937-38 (Ill 1992) (pubic hair).
255. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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hopefully this Article will encourage and assist practicing attorneys,
courts, and commentators as we seek to both preserve liberties and
encourage effective law enforcement.
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APPENDIX
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND STATE ANALOGS
FOURTH AMENDMENT
U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."
ALABAMA
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 5: "That the people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and possessions from unreasonable seizure or
searches, and that no warrants shall issue to search any place or to
seize any person or thing without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation."
ALASKA
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14 (analog): "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (no federal counterpart): "The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed. The
legislature shall implement this section."
ARIZONA
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
ARKANSAS
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 15: "The right of the people of this State to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue, except upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized."
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CALIFORNIA
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be
seized."
COLORADO
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or things shall
issue without describing the placed to be searched, or the person or
thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing."
CONNECTICUT
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches or
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation."
DELAWARE
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 6: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor
then, unless there be probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation."
FLORIDA
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (analog): "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable interception of
private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by
affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the
person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to
be intercepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. This right
shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
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Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in violation of this
right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles or information
would be inadmissible under decisions of the United States Supreme
Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United States
Constitution."
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (no federal counterpart): "Every natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided
herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of
access to public records and meetings as provided by law."
GEORGIA
GA. CONST. art. I, § I, XIII: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
HAWAII
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7 (analog): "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized or the communications sought to be
intercepted."
HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (no federal counterpart): "The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take
affirmative steps to implement this right."
IDAHO
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
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ILLINOIS
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6: "The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions
of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
INDIANA
IND. CONST. art. I, § 11: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or
seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
IOWA
IOWA CONST. art. I, § 8: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be
seized."
KANSAS
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons and property against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or property to be seized."
KENTUCKY
KY. CONST. § 10: "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and possessions, from unreasonable search and seizure; and no
warrant shall issue to search any place, or seize any person or thing,
without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable
cause supported by oath or affirmation."
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LOUISIANA
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5: "Every person shall be secure in his person,
property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant
shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or
things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search.
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court."
MAINE
ME. CONST. art. I, § 5: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable
cause-supported by oath or affirmation."
MARYLAND
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. 26: "That all warrants, without
oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person
or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to
search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without
naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and
ought not to be granted."
MASSACHUSETFS
MASS. CONST. Declaration of Rights pt. 1, art. XIV: "Every subject has
a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants,
therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them
be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in
the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of
search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in
cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws."
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MICHIGAN
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11: "The person, houses, papers and possessions
of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall
not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any
narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous
weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling
house in this state."
MINNESOTA
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized."
MISSISSIPPI
MISS. CONST. art. III, § 23: "The people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search;
and no warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and
the person or thing to be seized."
MISSOURI
MO. CONST. art. I, § 15: "That the people shall be secure in their
persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
person or thing to be seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable
cause, supported by written oath or affirmation."
MONTANA
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11 (analog): "The people shall be secure in
their persons, papers, homes and effects from unreasonable searches
and seizures. No warrant to search any place, or seize any person or
thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched or the
person or thing to be seized, or without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation reduced to writing."
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MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (no federal counterpart): "The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest."
NEBRASKA
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 7: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
NEVADA
NEV. CONST. art I, § 18: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and
searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on
probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or
persons, and thing or things to be seized."
NEW HAMPSHIRE
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 19: "Every subject hath a right to be secure
from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses,
his papers, and all his possessions. Therefore, all warrants to search
suspected places, or arrest a person for examination or trial in
prosecutions for criminal matters, are contrary to this right, if the cause
or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or
affirmation; and if the order, in a warrant to a civil officer, to make
search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons
or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special
designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and
no warrant ought to be issued; but in cases, and with the formalities,
prescribed by law."
NEW JERSEY
N.J. CONST. art. I, 7: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be
seized."
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NEW MEXICO
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
papers, homes, and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall
issue without describing the place to be searched, or the papers or
things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation."
NEW YORK
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 : "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be
violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or
affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of
crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means of
communication, and particularly describing the person or persons
whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof."
NORTH CAROLINA
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20: "General warrants, whereby any officer or
other person may be commanded to search suspected places without
evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted."
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be
seized."
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OHIO
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and possessions, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person and
things to be seized."
OKLAHOMA
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 30: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches or seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, describing
as particularly as may be the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized."
OREGON
OR. CONST. art. I, § 9: "No law shall violate the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
PENNSYLVANIA
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or
things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to
by the affiant."
RHODE ISLAND
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, papers and possessions, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on
complaint in writing, upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and describing as nearly as may be, the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
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SOUTH CAROLINA
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, the person or thing to be seized, and the information to be
obtained."
SOUTH DAKOTA
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 11: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
TENNESSEE
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 7: "That the people shall be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and that general warrants, whereby an officer may be
commanded to search suspected places, without evidence of the fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose
offences are not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted."
TEXAS
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9: "The people shall be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or
searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or
thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation."
UTAH
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 14: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized."
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VERMONT
VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 11: "That the people have a right to hold
themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions, free from search or
seizure; and therefore warrants, without oath or affirmation first made,
affording sufficient foundation for them, and whereby by any officer or
messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places,
or to seize any person or persons, his, her or their property, not
particularly described, are contrary to that right, and ought not to be
granted."
VIRGINIA
VA. CONST. art. I, § 10: "That general warrants, whereby an officer or
messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without
evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and supported
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted."
WASHINGTON
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
WEST VIRGINIA
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6: "The rights of the citizens to be secure in
their houses, persons, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing
to be seized."
WISCONSIN
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 11: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized."
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WYOMING
WYO. CONST. art. I, § 4: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized."
